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A Process Theory of Natural Law and the
Rule of Law in China*
Mark C. Modak-Truran**
I.

Introduction

Exporting the Rule of Law has been a strong focus of American,
British, and European foreign policy since the end of World War I.1
The post-war constitutions of Germany and Japan followed Western
notions of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. The end of the
Cold War resulted in many former Eastern-bloc communist countries
implementing Western-style democratic constitutions and notions of the
rule of law. Similarly, in 1979, Deng Xiaoping engineered China's
"opening to the West,",2 which began China's efforts to implement the
rule of law. Recently, President George W. Bush has paradoxically
employed military means in Afghanistan and Iraq to spread "democracy"
* Portions of this article are based on an entry I wrote entitled Prolegomena to a
Process Theory of Natural Law, 1 HANDBOOK OF WHITEHEADIAN PROCESS THOUGHT 50719, 533-36 (Michel Weber and Will Desmond, eds., Ontos Verlag, 2008). I would like to
thank Larry Catd Backer for organizing this symposium and for generously asking me to
participate in this important conversation about the rule of law in national, international,
comparative, and transnational contexts.
** J. Will Young Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A.,
Gustavus Adolphus College; J.D., Northwestern University; A.M., Ph.D., The University
of Chicago. I would like to thank Mississippi College for supporting my work on this
Article. I also want to thank Zhihe Wang and John Cobb for inviting me to deliver an
earlier version of this Article at a conference entitled Law, Morality, and Politicsfrom a
Constructive Post-modern Perspective at China University for Political Science and Law
in Beijing, China on July 8-9, 2007, which was sponsored by the Center for Process
Studies China Project.
1.

Cf J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 409-10 (Oxford

U. Press 1992). Kelly emphasizes that:
[j]ust as the experiences of the era which, in Western Europe, closed in 1945
led to a firmer entrenchment of constitutionalism and of human rights, as well
as to a revival of interest in natural law, so the ideal of legality (the rule of law,
the Rechtsstaat) increased in value and acceptance.
Id.
2. Jamie P. Horsley, The Rule of Law in China: Incremental Progress, in THE
BALANCE SHEET IN 2007 AND BEYOND 94 (C. Fred Bergsten, N. Lardy, B. Gill & D.
Mitchell eds., 2007).
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and the "rule of law" as a prophylactic measure against the spread of
terrorism. In all these cases, the focus on the rule of law makes sense
given that "the3 rule of law has been truly said to be the soul of the
modem state."
The rule of law, however, faces critical challenges both in America
and abroad. In America, legal indeterminacy and the ontological gap
between legal theory and legal practice present two quandaries that defy
resolution by contemporary normative theories of law. Although legal
theorists (ranging from extreme-radical deconstructionists
to
contemporary legal formalists) disagree about the degree of legal
indeterminacy,4 they overwhelmingly agree that the law is
indeterminate.' The law is indeterminate because there are hard cases
where the apparently relevant statutes, common law, contracts, or
constitutional law provisions at issue fail to resolve disputes. Thus, legal
indeterminacy raises the specter that judicial decisions in hard cases are
illegitimate because judges must rely on personal political, moral or
religious beliefs.
Despite the widespread consensus that the law is indeterminate,
contemporary legal theory fails to provide a normative theory of law to
explain how the law can be rationally legitimated in hard cases. For
example, legal positivists, like H.L.A. Hart, recognize legal
indeterminacy 6 or an "open texture" to the law, but maintain that judges
have "discretion" to decide hard cases without specifying how they
should exercise that discretion.7 Critical legal studies, feminist legal
theory, and critical race theory disavow the possibility of an apolitical
legitimation of law and focus on deconstructing hidden political bias
3.

ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL

THEORY 192 (The Free Press 1976).

4. Legal theorist Ken Kress notes that:
versions of indeterminacy differ according to whether they claim that the court
has complete discretion to achieve any outcome at all (execute the plaintiff who
brings suit to quiet title to his cabin and surrounding property in the Rocky
Mountains) or rather has a limited choice among a few options (hold for
defendant or plaintiff within a limited range of monetary damages or other
remedies), or some position in between.
Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY,
THEORY, AND PRACTICE 200-01 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992).
5. The consensus ranges from extreme-radical deconstructionists such as Anthony
D'Amato to contemporary legal formalists such as Ernest J. Weinrib. Compare Anthony
D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-Aged President, 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 250 (1989) (arguing that the United States' constitutional requirement
that the president be thirty-five years of age is indeterminate) with Ernest J. Weinrib,
Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 1008 (1988)
(claiming that "[n]othing about formalism precludes indeterminacy").
6. H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 144 (Oxford U. Press 1961).
7. Id. at 138, 144 & 152.
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relating to class, gender, and race. Finally, some legal theorists have
unsuccessfully attempted to deny legal indeterminacy. For instance,
Ronald Dworkin has remained committed to his Right Answer Thesisthere is a "right answer" in hard cases, except in extremely rare or exotic
ones8---even though his interpretive theory of law has been shown to
make the entire system of law indeterminate. 9
In Law's Quandary, Steven D. Smith identifies the second
important quandary for contemporary normative theories of law. He
persuasively argues that the metaphysical or ontological presuppositions
of the practice of law are inconsistent with the presuppositions of
contemporary legal theory.' 0 The practice of law presupposes a classical
or religious ontology while contemporary legal theory usually
presupposes a scientific ontology (i.e., scientific materialism)." Smith
concludes that this "ontological gap"' 12 between the practice of law and
legal theory presents "a metaphysical predicament" that "will require us
to 'take metaphysics seriously."",13 Smith's argument suggests that legal
theorists can no longer ignore the issue of metaphysical or ontological
presuppositions, but he confesses that he has "no idea what the answer to
that question might be."' 4 The following will address this quandary and
show that the prognosis is not as dire as Smith suggests.
Promoting the rule of law abroad raises questions about whether the
Western presuppositions of the rule of law are compatible with the

8. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 143 (Harvard U. Press 1985)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES]. Despite much criticism, Dworkin
continues to embrace his right answer thesis. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN
ROBES 41-43 (Harvard U. Press 2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES]. See
also text accompanying notes 125-30.
9. Kenneth Kress convincingly argued that coherency theories, like Dworkin's,
require a reconstruction of the system of legal norms in each hard case that is decided,
which results in a continuous reconfiguration of the system of legal norms (the "ripple
effect") and amounts to a retroactive interpretation of existing law. Although judges are
not exercising discretion, they are creating new law by changing the settled law in the
process of interpretation. Each hard case requiring the reconstruction of the political
conception of justice thus creates a ripple in the coherent system of legal norms and
makes the system indeterminate. See Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence
Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72
CAL. L. REV. 369, 380-82 (1984). This results in a continuous reconfiguration of the
system of legal norms (the "ripple effect") and amounts to a retroactive interpretation of
existing law. Although judges are not exercising discretion, they are creating new law by
changing the settled law in the process of interpretation. Each hard case requiring the
reconstruction of the political conception of justice thus creates a ripple in the coherent
system of legal norms and makes the system indeterminate. See infra Section II, A.
10.

See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (Harvard U. Press 2004).

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.at 155.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 177.
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presuppositions of other cultures. Renowned cultural anthropologist
Clifford Geertz argues that law "is not a bounded set of norms, rules,
principles, [or] values.., but part of a distinctive manner of imagining
the real."15 He further cautions that "the comparative study of law
cannot be a matter of reducing concrete differences to abstract
commonalities."' 16 Rather, law is "local knowledge; local not just as to
place, time, class, and variety of issue, but as to accent-vernacular
characterizations of what happens connected to vernacular imaginings of
what can." 17 As discussed below, Larry Catd Backer, Brian Tamanaha,
and Donald Clarke recognize some of these concerns in their criticisms
of efforts to rigidly implement an American notion of the rule of law in
China without consideration of cultural differences.
Moreover, without a normative theory of law that can make the rule
of law culturally sensitive and address legal indeterminacy and the
ontological gap, the rule of law is in serious peril in America and even
more questionable as an export abroad. Is it meaningful to continue
talking about the rule of law? Do legal indeterminacy and the
ontological gap mean that law is primarily guided by local social norms
and customs rather than universal rules and principles? Do different
cultural circumstances in the West and the East warrant different
conceptions of the rule of law? If so, can a normative theory of law
legitimate these culturally sensitive conceptions without devolving into
cultural relativism?
To address these issues, this Article analyzes China's efforts to
implement the rule of law and proposes a constructive, post-modern
normative theory of law based on the Process Philosophy of Alfred
North Whitehead and the Radical Empiricism of William James. This
"process theory of natural law"18 provides a novel theory of natural law
15.

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:

FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE

ANTHROPOLOGY 173 (Basic Books, Inc., 1983) (emphasis added). Robert Cover
similarly argued that we inhabit a nomos-a normative universe.
We constantly create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and
unlawful, of valid and void. The student of law may come to identify the
normative world with the professional paraphernalia of social control. The
rules and principles of justice, the formal institutions of the law, and the
conventions of a social order are, indeed, important to that world; they are,
however, but a small part of the normative universe that ought to claim our
attention. No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the
narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an
epic, for each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the
narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be
observed, but a world in which we live.
Robert M. Cover, Foreword:Nomos and Narrative,97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983).
16. Geertz, supra note 15, at 215.
17. Id.
18. The process theory of natural law is not related in any way to the Legal Process
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that eliminates the perceived illegitimacy arising from legal
indeterminacy and closes the ontological gap between legal theory and
practice. Process natural law also mediates many of the cultural
differences between the East and the West through the telos of beauty
(unity-in-diversity), which entails maximizing both an Eastern aesthetic
sense of order (emergent harmony or spontaneous order) and a Western
rational sense of order (complexity arising from diverse individual
orderings). In accordance with the telos of beauty, process natural law
further supports a culturally sensitive conception of the rule of law
because, as Whitehead emphasizes, "[e]ach society has its own type of
perfection." 19 This conception of the rule of law allows for important
cultural differences to be reflected in the interpretation of democracy and
formal legality and in the instantiation of individual rights in the law.
Thus, the ideal rule of law may look quite different in the United States
("U.S.") and China and may continue to evolve in our constantly
changing, pluralistic, and multicultural world.
To support this argument, Section II will discuss Western
conceptions of the rule of law, the implementation of the rule of law in
China, Eastern and Western notions of social order, and the affinities
between Process Philosophy and Chinese thought. Section III will
identify the threat of illegitimacy to the rule of law arising from legal
indeterminacy and the ontological gap between legal theory and legal
practice as the two key quandaries for contemporary legal theory.
Section IV will discuss Whitehead's theistic teleology of beauty and his
treatment of law, as well as the emerging process scholarship on law and
human rights. Finally, Section V will demonstrate the promise of
School of Jurisprudence and its notion of the rule of law, which gained prominence in the
1950s. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip

P. Frickey eds., The Foundation Press 1994). Rather than discerning metaphysical or
ontological principles about the universe like process philosophy, the Legal Process
conception of the rule of law focused on several factors, such as: (1) "procedural fairness
in the development and application of legal norms," (2) "an assumed connection between
notions of law and reasonableness," (3) "reasoned elaboration of the connection between
recognized, pre-existing sources of legal authority and the determination of rights and
responsibility in particular cases," and (4) "judicial review as a guarantor of procedural
fairness and rational deliberation by legislative, executive, and administrative
decisionmakers." Id. at 18. Legal Process conceded that the law was sometimes
indeterminate and that judges relied on extra-legal sources. However, Legal Process held
out the aspiration "to root law at least partly in a current, normative consensus perceived
as adequate to validate particular decision making processes and their outcomes as
lawful." Id. at 19. The chief criticism of this approach seems to be the recognition that
even if the 1950s included a discernable normative consensus, that normative consensus
no longer exists in the twenty-first century.
19. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS 291 (The Free Press 1933)
[hereinafter WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURE OF IDEAS].
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process thought for articulating a new theory of natural law that
legitimates the law even when it is indeterminate, that closes the

ontological gap between legal theory and legal practice, and that
provides a culturally sensitive conception of the rule of law.
II.

The Rule of Law, Eastern and Western Notions of Social Order, and
Process Philosophy

Implementing the rule of law in China began in 1979 when Deng
Xiaoping engineered China's "opening to the West," and has continued
to receive attention at all levels of government. 20 In 1982, the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China ("PRC Constitution")
was adopted and clearly demonstrated the government's goal of fostering
the rule of law. 21 The 1999 Amendments further acknowledged China's
goal of "ruling the country
in accordance with the law and building a
22
socialist country of law.",
Although the PRC Constitution provides for developing a "socialist
democracy" and improving the "socialist legal system,, 23 it has many
provisions that are similar2 4 to the U.S. Constitution. While the PRC
Constitution acknowledges that China is "[u]nder the leadership of the
Communist Party of China" ("CCP"), 25 it also emphasizes that the PRC
Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, "is the fundamental law of the

state and has supreme legal authority," so that:
The people of all nationalities, all state organs, the armed forces, all
political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and
undertakings in the country must take the Constitution as the basic
norm of conduct, and they have the duty to26uphold the dignity of the
Constitution and ensure its implementation.
The Preamble and Article 5 make it clear that the PRC Constitution, like
the U.S. Constitution,27 is the supreme law of the land. The PRC
20.

See Horsley, supra note 2, at 94.

21.

XIAN

FA

(1982),

available

at

http://english.people.cn/constitution/

constitution.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
22. Id. at art. 5 (amended 1999).
23. Id. at pmbl.
24. The P.R.C. Constitution provides that all citizens are "equal before the law," that
citizens who are eighteen years old or older have "the right to vote, stand for election,
freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and association" as well as the "freedom of
religious belief." Id. at art. 33-36.
25. Id. at pmbl.
26. See, e.g., id. at art. 5 (amended 1999). Article 5 similarly provides that "[n]o law
or administrative or local rules and regulations shall contravene the constitution" and that
"[a]ll state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all
enterprises and undertakings must abide by the Constitution and the law." Id.
27. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides that:
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Constitution further provides that all citizens are "equal before the law,"
that citizens who are eighteen years old have "the right to vote and stand
for election, and that citizens have the "freedom of speech, of the press,
of assembly and association," and "freedom of religious belief., 28 Also,
the PRC Constitution grants the National People's Congress ("NPC")
legislative powers, provides for a president and vice president to be
elected by the NPC for a maximum of two terms, and establishes the
"Supreme People's Court" as the "highest judicial organ" along with
lower-level "people's courts. 29
A.

The Rule of Law

Despite the obvious parallels between the Chinese and U.S.
Constitutions, many scholars (including some Chinese scholars)3° claim
that China is not yet a rule of law country. 3' In this respect, Donald
Clarke has emphasized that Americans often use an "Ideal Western Legal
Order" (which the U.S. often fails to live up to) as the criterion for
evaluating the actual practices of the Chinese legal system. 32 Clarke
notes that "China's criminal procedure as actually practiced (and as
reported by various human rights organizations) is compared with an
ideal picture of the American criminal process (and not the picture as
reported by various human rights organizations)" and "is found
wanting." 33 The main problem with this approach stems from its failure
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const., Art. VI (emphasis added).
28. XIAN FA, supranote 21, at arts. 33-36.
29. Id. at art. 57-84 & 123-35 (1982).
30. While recognizing that "[t]he concept of the rule of law originated in the West,"
Wang argues that implementing the rule of law in China will involve three stages
including: (1) "criminal law safeguards the general social order;" (2) "civil and
commercial laws provides a just, safe, and efficient business order;" and
(3) "constitutional law guarantees an open and just political order." Zhenmin Wang, The
Developing Rule of Law in China, HARV. ASIA QUARTERLY 1, 4 (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.asiaquarterly.com/index2.php?option=com-content&do.pdf=- 1&id=88 (last
visited Dec. 25, 2007).
31. Horsley, supra note 2, at 94. Similarly, David Kairys notes that he "found a
huge range of formulations and meanings for the rule of law in legal, historical,
academic, and popular usages," but concludes that "China does not have something that
we call the rule of law." David Kairys, Searchingfor the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 307, 308 (2003).
32. Donald C. Clarke, Puzzling Observationsin Chinese Law: When Is a Riddle Just
a Mistake?, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEROME A.

COHEN 93 & 95-97 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003).
33. Id. at 97.
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to sufficiently state and justify the ideal against which the Chinese legal
system is evaluated.34 Instead, Clarke maintains that "the best attainable
understanding of the Chinese legal system will not be simply the bestfitting model plus incompatible observations explained as errors. We
and to be alert to the need
must be prepared to apply multiple models
35
them."
among
nimbly
always to move
Using an Ideal Western Legal Order (i.e., the United States) as a
standard of evaluation also ignores that "the Rule of Law is ... an
'essentially contestable concept.' ' 36 Richard Fallon argues that there are
four competing ideal types of the rule of law-historicist, formalist,
37
Legal Process, and substantive-and many variations of each type.
Fallon demonstrates that the rule of law does not have a fixed meaning in
the American context, by showing that Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court, advocates each one of these types in his
opinions in different cases.38
Despite the contested nature of the rule of law, scholars seem to
agree that the rule of law is essentially a Western ideal but have
struggled to identify its essential aspects and have identified many
different types. Fred Dallmayr argues that the rule of law can be traced
back to Plato's and Aristotle's insistence that the "ideal regime is defined
by rule-govemance, namely, as a 'government of laws and not of
men.' 39 He cautions that "[t]his doctrine is not simply an accidental
political bias but is linked with central premises and hierarchical
postulates endemic to Western civilization: particularly the rule of reason
over arbitrary will, of universal principle over particular circumstances,
and ultimately of idea over matter., 40 Dallmayr warns that questioning
this entrenched "cultural-historical background" will likely have "a
deeply unsettling effect by touching the fiber of political and intellectual
life."' 4 1 The effect of hermeneutics on the rule of law is to disclose "the
unstable meaning of the phrase-the fact that, like the notion of reason,
34. Id. at 99.
35. Id. at 114.
36. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7 (1997). See also Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law
and the Legitimacy of ConstitutionalDemocracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1351 & 1309
(2001) (concluding from his analysis of the different meanings of the rule of law in
German, French, and Anglo-American traditions that "adherence to the rule of law in one
of the three traditions considered above emerges as a necessary but insufficient means to
legitimacy" for a "constitutional democracy in a contemporary pluralistic society").
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 40.
39. Fred Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 3, 4 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992).
40. Id.
41.

Id.
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rule and law are themselves the targets of continuous interpretation and
reinterpretation. 4 2 Thus, the process of interpretation may pause for a
momentary "sovereign prerogative," but the continuously changing
43
circumstances soon demand a new "concretely engaged interpretation.
Notwithstanding the continuous process of interpretation, some
scholars divide the rule of law into broad categories of formal and
substantive conceptions of the rule of law.4 4 Formal theories of legality
focus on the "proper sources and form of legality, 'A5 such as rule-by-law,
formal legality, and democracy plus legality.46 Tamanaha argues that
rule by law is the thinnest notion of formal legality as it merely requires
that government actions be authorized by law without mandating the
content of those laws.47 He notes that "[e]very modem state has the rule
of law in this narrow sense" and that "that this is the Chinese
government's preferred understanding of the rule of law. 48
Tamanaha notes that "formal legality is the dominant understanding
of the rule of law among legal theorists.

'49

Following the work of

Joseph Raz and Lon Fuller, Tamanaha maintains that formal legality
adds to the rule by law requirements that "the law must be prospective,
general, clear, public, and relatively stable" and that the process of
applying the law must involve "an independent judiciary, open and fair
hearings without bias, and review of legislative and administrative
officials and limitations on the discretion of police to insure conformity
to the requirements of the rule of law." 50 Some theorists, like Jiirgen
Habermas, also add "democracy as a procedural mode of legitimation for
law" 51 to formal legality to constitute the thickest formal theory of the
rule of law.
Substantive theories of the rule of law add to the formal
requirements further required content for the law such as individual
rights, the right of dignity and/or justice, and, in the thickest form, social
welfare requirements. Within Western societies, Tamanaha claims that
"when the phrase 'rule of law' is uttered it is typically understood to
include democracy and individual rights along with formal legality. 52

42. Id.
43. Id. at 17.
44. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE
92 (Cambridge U. Press 2004).
45. Id. at 92.
46. Id. at 91.
47. Id. at 92.
48. Id.
49. TAMAHANA, supra note 44, at 111.
50. Id.at 93.
51. Id. at 100.
52. Id. at 99-101.

OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 91-
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He notes that this "likely approximates the common sense of the rule of
law within Western societies. 53
However, unlike the culturally
dogmatic criticisms of China disparaged by Clarke, Tamanaha argues
that "[t]his understanding of the rule of law does not necessarily travel"
so that "China can implement formal legality without democracy" and
still be viewed as implementing the rule of law.54
Alternatively, while acknowledging that "China is not yet a rule of
law state," Larry Cat Backer argues that "no rule-of-law analysis of
China is useful or complete unless it seriously considers two structural
aspects of Chinese governance usually ignored in the standard
analysis., 55 He argues that both the role of the Chinese Communist Party
in political governance and the on-going effort of the CCP "to develop a
sound ideological basis for rule through law in China" 56 must be taken
into account. He "suggests that the Chinese State Government is a
combination of both the formal apparatus of government-its institutions
and governing instruments-and the CCP as the party in power. 5 7 Even
though most scholars criticize the CCP's continued role in governance as
contrary to the rule of law, they do not know how to respond to the
CCP's ideological statements.
Conversely, Backer analyzes the CCP's recent Sange Daibiao ("The
Three Represents") campaign, the "Two Musts" campaign, the "FishWater" connection, the ba rong ba chi ("Eight Honors Eight Disgraces")
campaign, and the "Three Harmonies" campaign.58
From these
ideological pronouncements, he concludes that "the CCP may more
openly embrace its role as a critical component of the state apparatus and
53. Id. at 111. Tamanaha points to Ronald Dworkin as a leading example of this
substantive theory of the rule of law. With respect to the rule of law, Dworkin rejects the
"rule-book conception" which "insists that, so far as is possible, the power of the state
should never be exercised against individual citizens accept in accordance with rules
explicitly setout in a public rule book available to all" and followed by the "government
as well as ordinary citizens" (i.e., formal legality). See id.; see also DWORKIN, A MATTER
OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 11. By contrast, he embraces a "rights conception of the
rule of law" which "assumes that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one
another, and political rights against the state as a whole" that "may be enforced upon the
demand of individual citizens through courts or other judicial institutions... so far as this
is practicable." Id. It adds to the rule-book (formal legality) rules that capture and
enforce these moral and political rights (individual rights). Dworkin also argues that this
rights-based notion "enriches democracy by adding an independent forum of principle."
Id. at 32.
54.

TAMANAHA, supranote 44, at 112.

55. Larry Catd Backer, The Rule of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and
Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (The Three Represents), Socialist Rule of Law,
and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 36

(2006).
56. Id. at 36.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 37.
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assume both the obligations and privileges of that role in a rule-of-law
context., 59 He further argues that the CCP ideology helps interpret the
changing role of the CCP in governance and provides clues to
understanding the PRC Constitution. For instance, the Preamble to the
PRC Constitution states that "the road of Chinese-style socialism" is
"under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng
60
Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of 'Three Represents."'
Backer argues that acknowledging these ideological pronouncements in
the Preamble may lead "to further incorporate [these pronouncements as]
substantive rule-of-law elements into Chinese constitutionalism., 6 The
CCP ideology may also someday play a role analogous to the ideology of
the Federalist Papers, which has been used in the American context to
interpret the U.S. Constitution.62 Backer concludes the CCP ideological
pronouncements provide important clues to understanding Chinese
conceptions of the rule of law and that "these organizing principles
recognize the foundational nature of some form of collectivity as basic to
Chinese society and political culture. 63
Despite the consensus that China has not yet implemented the rule
of law, Backer, Tamanaha, and Clarke argue that China's progress
should not be measured simply by its comparison with the usual Western
conception of the rule of law (formal legality, individual rights, and
democracy) or some idealized notion of it. Clarke and Tamanaha
question the efficacy of the usual Western conception for the unique
cultural situation in China. Backer goes further by suggesting that China
may represent a new model because of the unique role of the CCP and
the role of ideological pronouncements to become "substantive rule-oflaw elements into Chinese constitutionalism. ' '64 In addition, the next
section argues that more attention needs to be paid to Chinese aesthetic
notions of social order to further evaluate what conception of the rule of
law and normative legal theory are compatible with the unique cultural
circumstances in China.
B.

Eastern and Western Notions of Social Order

While scholars acknowledge the Western origins of the "common
sense" notion of the "rule of law" (formal legality, individual rights, and
democracy), they rarely explore whether its Western presuppositions are

59.
60.

Id. at 38.
XIAN FA, supra note 21, at pmbl. (amended 2004).

61.

CatA Backer, supra note 55, at 61.

62. Id. at 36-37.
63.

Id. at 37.

64. Id.
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compatible with the presuppositions in other cultures. With special
emphasis on American and Chinese notions, this Section will explore
some of the relevant differences between Western and Eastern notions of
social order, reason and experience, individualism and collectivism, law
and custom, and capitalism and socialism. Similarities between Chinese
thought and Whitehead's process philosophy will be noted in the next
Section, along with areas where process philosophy can mediate between
Eastern and Western notions. Stereotyping "Western" and "Eastern," or
"American" and "Chinese" cultural differences can be reductionistic.
However, ignoring these differences and imperialistically imposing
Western notions on China would be worse. In Janet Ainsworth's words,
"suppressing the significance of, on the one hand, China's Chineseness
or, on the other hand, its Marxism,... seriously distort[s] our
65
understanding of Chinese constitutional discursive practice.,
Consequently, this Section will identify several ways in which different
cultural tendencies are crucial for thinking about a normative theory of
law and the "rule of law."
Drawing on the extensive work by David Hall and Roger Ames,
Wang Shik Jang argues that "Whitehead's philosophy points the way" to
integrating the "aesthetic way of thinking," characteristic of Eastern
civilization, with the "rational way of thinking," characteristic of
Western civilization.66 Hall and Ames maintain that different forms of
social organization flow from these different ways of thinking. Further,
they hold that "rational or logical order consists in a pattern of
relatedness which is, in principle, indifferent to the elements whose
mutual relatedness comprise the order., 67 Rational ordering occurs in
accordance with conforming actions to "habits, customs, rules, or laws
determinate of our conduct" and moves "away from the concrete
particular towards 68the universal" and "tends toward uniformity and
pattern regularity.,
From the perspective of rational ordering, laws (both legal and
scientific) are beneficial because "external determining sources of order
provide the grounds for the perpetuation of a sense of rational
orderedness. 69 Laws "are products of lawgivers" either "as divine
commands, whose transcendent source provides their strongest

65.

Janet E. Ainsworth, Interpreting Sacred Texts: Preliminary Reflections on

ConstitutionalDiscourse in China, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 273, 298 (1992).

66.

Wang Shik Jang, A Philosophical Evaluation of Western and Eastern

Civilizationfrom a Whiteheadian Perspective, 33.1 PROCESS STUDIES 135, 135 (2004).
67. DAVID L. HALL & ROGER T. AMES, THINKING THROUGH CONFUCIUS 135 (State U.
of N.Y. Press 1987) [hereinafter HALL & AMES, THINKING THROUGH CONFUCIUS].

68. Id. at 134-36.
69. Id. at 138.
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justification," or "as rational principles articulating norms of behavior
and interaction characterized by fairness and productive of the greatest
social stability."7 ° This process of rational ordering dominates the
Western tradition and lends evidence to the Western origins of the rule of
law. Positing some abstract, universal standard for what counts as a legal
system is incidental to the Western desire for a rationally ordered society.
Roberto Unger unpacks many of the presuppositions of the rational
ordering achieved by the typical Western conception of the rule of law
offered by liberal legalism. Unger argues that in legal liberalism, "[t]he
main task of the theory of adjudication is to say when a decision can
truly be said to stand 'under a rule"' because "[o]nly decisions 'under a
rule' are consistent with freedom; others constitute arbitrary exercises of
judicial power.",7 1 Unger further points out that liberal political theory
adopts the principle of individualism; a concept which asserts that
"[g]roups are artificial because all values are individual and
subjective., 72 Society must be constructed and "held together by
rules. 73 Legislation and constitutions must be based on the will of the
people (an aggregation of subjective wills) because there are no "natural"
or rational social bonds. The rule of law ideal attempts to ensure that the
legislative process is done according to fair procedures and requires that
the laws are "general, impersonal, or neutral. 74 Once legislators have
made the law, the "simplest and most familiar account of legal justice"
claims that judges apply the law mechanically to reach the logical result
without interpreting the purposes or policies informing the law.75 Under
this account, adjudication does not have recourse to any objective moral,
political or religious truth to decide cases. The judge's role is
circumscribed by applying determinate legal rules and principles to
resolve cases. While Unger's characterization of liberal legalism is
somewhat exaggerated, it poignantly identifies the rational or logical
ordering at the root of legal liberalism's conception of the "rule of law."
In contrast to Western philosophy, Hall and Ames argue that
"Confucius' social and political philosophy gives priority to aesthetic
over rational ordering., 76 The "[a]esthetic order begins with the
uniqueness of the one thing and assesses this particular as contributing to
70. Id. at 170.
71. ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 89 (The Free Press 1975).
72. Id. at 83.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 88.
75. Id. at 92.
76. HALL & AMES, THINKING THROUGH CONFUCIUS, supra note 67, at 158. Jang
emphasizes that he departs from Hall and Ames's analysis by arguing that both ways of
thinking are always present in each culture but that one way of thinking tends to
dominate the other. See Jang, supra note 66, at 136.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:3

the balanced complexity of its context., 77 It is "constituted by just those
particularities... those features that distinguish one ordering perspective
from another., 78 Hall and Ames argue that "Confucius' ideal is a society
in which the application of laws is not necessary., 79 For Confucius, both
rulers and people should participate voluntarily in "an emergent harmony
defined by the personal display of meaning and value in the performance
of ritual action" so that the aesthetic "order is effected by a modeling
80
process in which personal cultivation above inspires emulation below."
In this process, the participants become the sociopoliticalorder based on
the emergent harmony from their voluntary participation. 8 1 Julia Ching
adds that "[t]he evolution of law in China may be described as the
devolution of ritual (li) into law (fa) and of law into punishment
(xing). 8 2 This devolution resulted in the term "law" being associated
mainly with penal law in Chinese society. Thus, in the Chinese context,
the "rule of law" (as the negative sense of cheng) signals the failure of
spontaneous voluntary ordering based on ritual and targets merely "a
minimum 83standard of orderly conduct" for "the sake of general
harmony.,
Not surprisingly, Ching notes "that human rights are not historically
a Chinese concept, but a Western import., 84 The word "rights" does not
have an exact Chinese equivalent and is usually translated as "power."
HALL & AMES, THINKING THROUGH CONFUCIUS, supra note 67, at 158.
78. Id. at 138.
79. Id. at 169.
80. Id. at 157.
81. Id. at 157-58. In THINKING FROM THE HAN, Hall and Ames further emphasize
that:
In the Analects, this sense of harmony is celebrated as the highest cultural
achievement. Here, harmony is distinguished from mere agreement by again
involving the central role of particularity. The family metaphor pervades this
text, encouraged by the intuition that this is the institution which members
typically give themselves most fully and unreservedly to the group.
"Propriety" or full participation in ritualized roles and relationships (li) is the
pursuit of a flourishing community through the personalization of overlapping
familial roles and relationships.
77.

DAVID L. HALL & ROGER T. AMES, THINKING FROM THE HAN: SELF, TRUTH, AND

TRANSCENDENCE INCHINESE AND WESTERN CULTURE 181 (State U. of N.Y. Press 1998)
[hereinafter HALL & AMES, THINKING FROM THE HAN]. In exploring this notion of

harmony in Confucian thought, Hall and Ames draw on a few of Whitehead's "technical
terms of aesthetic analysis." Id. at 182-86. With respect to the Chinese notion of
harmony, Roberto Unger argues that in the Chinese feudal period "the impulse to deify
the world was so strong that a separation between nature and society was precluded" and
that "[tihe notion that the basic structure of social life might be manipulated through
made law was largely unknown." UNGER, supra note 3, at 95.
82. Julia Ching, Human Rights: A Valid Chinese Concept?, in CONFUCIANISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 67, 74 (Wm. Theodore De Bary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998).
83. HALL & AMES, THINKING THROUGH CONFUCIUS, supra note 67, at 157-58.

84.

Ching, supra note 82, at 70.
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To incorporate these Western notions, "the Chinese language had to coin
a word for 'freedom' (ziyou, literally, self-determination). The closest
classical term was ziran (literally, the natural), connoting more a Taoist
85
sense of harmony with nature than of Promethean self-assertion.'
Consequently, "the concept of freedom as a right-such as the right to
freedom of thought and religion, to freedom of speech and assemblywas never clearly articulated until modem times, and under Western
influence. 86
Recently, Confucian thought has become increasingly emphasized
by Chinese political leaders and by journalists and scholars attempting to
understand Chinese culture, government, and China's implementation of
the "rule of law." For example, President Hu Jintao recently published
his "Theory of the Three Harmonies" as a summary of his view of
Chinese statecraft and its effort to bolster the CCP's "Mandate of
Heaven." 87 Hong Kong journalist Willy Lam noted that the "Theory of
the Three Harmonies" was derived from the "Communist-Chinese canon
as well as ancient Confucian classics" and "can be rendered as 'seeking
peace in the world, reconciliation with Taiwan, and harmony in Chinese
society.' ' 88 Lam further emphasized that, "since gaining power at the
1 6 th CCP Congress in late 2002, both President Hu and Premier Wen
Jiabao have presented themselves as 'people-caring
sage-emperors' in
89
the mold of Confucius' ideal, humanistic rulers."
In contrast, the CCP and Chinese government have tried to
deemphasize Marxist-Leninist principles. In a recent article in the New
York Times, Joseph Kahn reports that the new versions of standard
world history texts for high school students in China "de-emphasize
dynastic change, peasant struggle, ethnic rivalry and war, some critics
say, because the leadership does not want people thinking that such
things matter a great deal." 90 Kahn reports claims that the "changes
passed high-level scrutiny" and that the textbooks "reflected the political
viewpoints of China's top leaders, including Jiang Zemin, the former
president and Communist Party chief, and his successor, Hu Jintao." 91
Kahn further speculates that "Mr. Jiang's 'Three Represents' slogan
aimed to broaden the Communist Party's mandate and dilute its
traditional emphasis on class struggle" while President Hu's "Theory of
85.
86.
87.
2006, at
88.
89.
90.
2006, at
91.

Id. at 73.
Id.
Willy Lam, Hu Jintao's "Theory of the Three Harmonies,"CHINA BRIEF, Jan. 3,
1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Joseph Kahn, Where's Mao? Chinese Revise History Books, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
Al.
Id.
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the Three Harmonies," "aims to persuade people to build a stable,
prosperous, unified China under one-party rule. 9 2
These textbook changes appear consistent with some of China's
recently stated Constitutional goals to "develop a socialist market
economy, advance socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal
system and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry,
agriculture, national defense and science and technology step by step to
turn China into a powerful and prosperous social country with a high
level of culture and democracy." 93 With respect to implementing the
"rule of law," this strategy seems crucial because of the pejorative view
of law in classic Marxist thought. For example, the Manifesto of the
Communist Party provides that:
So long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property,
the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, and law.
Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your
bourgeois production and bourgeois property, a will, whose essential
character and direction are9 4 determined by the economical conditions
of existence of your class.
It is hard to imagine that taking a strong Marxist position on the nature of
law and private property could be seen as consistent with China's shift
towards a socialist market economy under the "rule of law." Hall and
Ames stress this point by asserting that "[i]n instance after instance in
recent Chinese history, the rhetoric has been Marxist while the
motivation and sentiment ' 95has, in the broadest sense, been more
traditional and 'Confucian."'
C. ProcessPhilosophy and Chinese Thought
One of the important affinities between Chinese and Whiteheadian
thought concerns the priority of process or becoming over substance or
being. This priority of process will be helpful for understanding the
changing nature of most of the "natural laws" in process natural law
discussed below in Section V. In their introduction to The Analects of
Confucius, Ames and Rosemont assert that classical Chinese texts show
''a more relational focus: not a concern to describe how things are in
themselves, but how they stand in relations to something else at

92. Id.
93. XIAN FA, supra note 21, at pmbl.
94. Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 469, 487 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
95. DAVID L. HALL & ROGER T. AMEs, ANTICIPATING CHINA: THINKING THROUGH
THE NARRATIVES OF CHINESE AND WESTERN CULTURE xv (State U. of N.Y. Press 1995).
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particular times.
Furthermore, they note that "early Chinese thinkers
never seem to have perceived any substances that remained the same
through time; rather.... Dao, the totality of all things (wanwu), is a
process that requires the language of both 'change (bian)' and
'persistence (tong)' to capture its dynamic disposition." 97 In this respect,
David Griffin recounts that:
Whitehead himself stimulated discussion with his oft-quoted remark
that his philosophy "seems to approximate more to some strains of
Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European,
thought." ... [I]n the fact that his philosophy, like Chinese thought,
"makes process ultimate," whereas the other type of thought "makes
98
fact ultimate."
Whitehead's observation recognizes a major difference between the
classical Western metaphysics approach versus the process metaphysics
approach to explaining the basic elements that make up existence.
Classical metaphysics is substance metaphysics. The universe is
comprised of one or more substances that form the basic building blocks
of the universe. For example, the essence of Spinoza's metaphysics can
be summarized with a few key propositions about God: the eternal and
infinite substance and cause (not in the sense of creator) of the universe.
God is the only substance and "is the efficient cause of all things that can
come within the scope of infinite intellect." 99 Once we understand God's
nature, everything else flows from it as a matter of logical necessity; God
or Nature is presupposed by or is the condition of conceiving of
everything else.
Conversely, process metaphysics (the philosophy of organism)
maintains that the final real things of the universe are actual occasions or
entities, which are units of process (or processes of becoming) rather
than substances (being) in the traditional sense. Process metaphysics
rejects the "substance-quality concept" in the Spinoza example and
replaces it with a "description of dynamic process."' 00 This dynamic
process-the philosophy of organism-can be summarized as "[t]he
96.

Roger T. Ames & Henry Rosemont, Jr., Introduction: Historicaland Textual

Background, in THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS: A PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSLATION 1, 23

(Roger T. Ames & Henry Rosemont, Jr. trans. & eds., 1998).
97. Id. at 26.
98. David Ray Griffin, Whitehead, China, Postmodern Politics, and Global
Democracy, in WHITEHEAD AND CHINA: RELEVANCE AND RELATIONSHIPS 25,

36-37

(Wenyu Xie, Zhihe Wang, & George E. Derfer eds., 2005).
99. BARUCH SPINOZA, THE ETHICS: TREATISE ON THE EMENDATION OF THE INTELLECT
39, 43 (Seymour Feldman ed., Samuel Shirley trans., 1992).
100. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY (David Ray Griffin &
Donald W. Sherburn eds., corrected ed., Free Press 1978) (1929) [hereinafter
WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY].
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many become one and are increased by one.''
Process metaphysics,
like all other philosophical schemes, is an abstraction from concrete
experience.
Whitehead tries to avoid the "fallacy of misplaced
concreteness"-"the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the
concrete"l 02 -by grounding the philosophy of organism in the most
concrete elements of our experience which he refers to as actual entities.
The Whiteheadian world is a microcosmic multitude of actual entities
(the many); it is atomistic. The becoming, the being and relatedness of
actual entities (i.e., "the many become one and are increased by one") is
what the whole of Process andReality is concerned with describing.
Whitehead arrived at his process metaphysics by employing what he
refers to as the method of Speculative Philosophy. 10 3 Speculative
Philosophy involves "the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical,
necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our
experience can be interpreted" 0 4 and utilizes both rational and empirical
approaches to this task. In this context, interpretation means that
everything we are conscious of (the many) will be a particular instance
(the one) of the general scheme (the many becoming one and are
increased by one). More specifically, the philosophical scheme must
meet four criteria:
it must be coherent, logical, applicable, and
adequate. 0 5 The two terms, coherent (all basic notions presuppose each
other) and logical (consistency), make up the rational side of
Whitehead's philosophy. 0 6 The other two terms, applicable (some basis
in concrete experience) and adequate (includes all conceivable
experience), refer to the empirical side.'0 7
Speculative Philosophy only asymptotically approaches a final
formulation of the first metaphysical principles because of deficiencies
of language and imaginative penetration. By utilizing the "true method
of discovery," Whitehead argues that some progress can be made. The
true method of discovery integrates the rational and empirical sides of
Whitehead's philosophy. It can be best understood by analogy to the
flight of plane. The true method of discovery "starts from the ground of
particular observation" (applicability); "it makes a flight in the thin air of
imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation"
(adequacy), which is "rendered acute by rational interpretation"

101.

Id.at 21.

102. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 51 (Free Press
1967) (1925) [hereinafter WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD].
103. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 100, at 3.

104.
105.
106.
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(coherency, consistency). 10 8
This method attempts to derive a
philosophical scheme which universally explains all our experience and
provides those conditions that are presupposed by any self-understanding
at all.
Like Whitehead's Speculative Philosophy, Wang Shik Jang
concludes "that a civilization will turn out to be ideal when the rational
and aesthetic ways of thinking are kept in balance. ' 1°9 To this end,
Speculative Philosophy foreshadows the rational and empirical sides of
practical reasoning utilized by the process theory of natural law
discussed below. Furthermore, process natural law will help achieve this
ideal civilization by providing a flexible and culturally sensitive
conception of the "rule of law" and by overcoming the two most
significant quandaries
for contemporary
legal theory-legal
indeterminacy and the ontological gap.
III. Two Quandaries for the Rule of Law and Contemporary Legal
Theory
A.

Legal Indeterminacy

The first important quandary for contemporary legal theory
concerns the overwhelming consensus that the law is indeterminate
without any consensus regarding the normative justification of judicial
decision making and the rule of law under the conditions of legal
indeterminacy. While legal indeterminacy is widely embraced, there is
little agreement about the degree or scope of legal indeterminacy. On
one hand, extreme-radical deconstructionists, such as Anthony D'Amato,
have argued that even the U.S. constitutional requirement that the
president be thirty-five years of age is not an easy case (i.e.,
0
indeterminate).11
On the other hand, contemporary legal formalists,
such as Ernest Weinrib, claim that "[n]othing about formalism precludes
indeterminacy."'1 1 Weinrib asserts that "formalism does not rely on the
108.

WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY,

supra note 100, at 5.

109. Jang, supra note 66, at 136.
110. See D'Amato, supra note 5, at 250 (citing Judge Frank Easterbrook's view that
the constitutional minimum age requirement of thirty-five years old for presidential
eligibility is subject to varying interpretations such as "the number of revolutions of the
world around the sun, as a percentage of average life expectancy (so that the Constitution
now has age fifty as a minimum), or as a minimum number of years after puberty (so the
minimum now is thirty or so)"). Id. D'Amato notes that "[d]econstructionists say that all
interpretation depends on context. Radical deconstructionists add that, because contexts
can change, there can be no such thing as a single interpretation of any text that is
absolute and unchanging for all time." Id. at 252. See also Anthony D'Amato, Aspects
of Deconstruction:The Failureof the Word "Bird," 84 Nw. L. REv. 536 (1990).
111. Weinrib, supra note 5, at 1008.
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antecedent determinacy for particular cases of the concepts entrenched in
positive law," but that "the organ of positive law has the function of
controversy."' 12
indeterminate
antecedently
an
determining
Consequently, in its weaker forms, the indeterminacy thesis merely
signals the almost universal rejection of strong legal formalism.
Christopher Columbus Langdell is often considered the archetype of
strong legal formalism. 1 3 He considered law a science and claimed that
"all the available materials of that science are contained in printed
books."'114 Supporters of Langdell argued that common law cases could
be reduced to a formal system and that the judge, like a technician, could
determine the right decision as a matter of deductive logic by
pigeonholing cases into the formal system.11 5 In other words, strong
legal formalism maintains that legal decision making is essentially a
deductive process whereby the application of legal rules results in
determinative outcomes from the constraints imposed by the language of
the law."l 6 Strong legal formalism thus provided a persuasive argument
that under the "rule of law," judges can decide cases independently of
extra-legal norms from morality, politics, and religion.
In response, both legal realists and the critical legal studies
movement ("CLS") have forcefully undermined the feasibility of strong
legal formalism by demonstrating the indeterminacy of the law. In fact,
the origin of the consensus about the indeterminacy of the law can be
traced back to the legal realists critique of Langdell and other strong
legal formalists."1 7 For example, Karl Llewellyn rejects deductive legal
certainty and argues that "legal rules do not lay down any limits within
which a judge moves." ' 1 8 Rather, Llewellyn argues:
[A] legal rule functions not as a closed space within which one
remains, but rather as a bough whose branches are growing; in short,
112. Id.
113. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42-43 (Yale Press 1977).
114. ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 175 (Cambridge 1967). For
further discussion of the dominance of strong legal formalism from the Civil War to
World War I, see GILMORE, supra, note 113, at 41-67.
115. Seeid. at43-44.
116. Cf MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND
POLITICS 33 (1998) (discussing the "new" versus the "old" legal formalism); see also
David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 539, 544 (1992)
(discussing the conception of the Bill of Rights as a Code, Strauss defines formalism as
including "three things: a heavy reliance on the precise language of the text; a pretense
that the text resolves more issues than it actually does; and an effort to shift responsibility
for a decision away from the actual decisionmaker and to some other party, such as the
Framers").
117.
118.

GILMORE, supra, note 113, at 42-43.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM, § 56, at 80 (Michael Ansaldi

trans., Paul Gewirtz ed., 1989).
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as a guideline and not as a starting premise; not as inflexible iron
armor which constrains or even forbids growth, but as a skeleton
which supports and conditions
growth, and even promotes and in
119
some particulars liberates it.
For legal realists, this understanding of legal rules entails a rule
skepticism that recognizes the indeterminacy of law.
CLS is also well known for its claim about the radical
indeterminacy of the law. It not only rejects strong legal formalism, but
also any attempt to find a rational principle that can resolve legal
indeterminacy. For instance, Mark Kelman argues that there is a CLS
version of legal indeterminacy that:
Is quite distinct from the Realist one. This stronger CLS claim is that
the legal system

is invariably simultaneously philosophically

committed to mirror-image contradictory norms, each of which
dictates the opposite result in any case (no matter how "easy" the
case first appears). While settled practice is not unattainable, the
CLS claim 20
is that settled justificatory schemes are in fact
unattainable. 1

Although there is little consensus about the nature and degree of
legal indeterminacy, 21 most legal theorists accept that the law is
indeterminate to the extent that there are hard cases where the apparently
relevant statutes, common law, contracts, or constitutional law provisions
do not provide sufficient guidance for a resolution. For example, the
indeterminacy of the U.S. Constitution results in conflicting judicial
interpretations of how it should apply to issues such as abortion,
physician-assisted suicide, and same-sex marriage. Ken Kress has noted
that "[t]he indeterminacy thesis asserts that law does not constrain judges
sufficiently, raising the specter that judicial decision making is often or
always illegitimate.' ' 122 Judges must rely on extra-legal norms to resolve
hard cases, which can result in inconsistent treatment of like cases and
arbitrary decisions.
Does this mean that judicial decision making is merely the arbitrary
exercise of political power, or is it just the product of the particular life
experience of the judge? 123 Lawrence Solum claims that:
119. Id.
120. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 13 (1987).
121. Kress, supra note 4, at 200-01.
122. Id. at 203.
123. Jerome Frank is well known for his claim that judicial decisions can, in
principle, be explained by a psychoanalysis of a judge's life experiences. See generally
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Peter Smith 1970) (1930). In Law and the

Modern Mind, Frank comments that:
[w]hat we may hope some day to get from our judges are detailed
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If the indeterminacy thesis is true, then legal justice will fall short of
the ideal of the "rule of law" in at least three ways: (1) judges will
rule by arbitrary decision, because radically indeterminate law cannot
constrain judicial decision; (2) the laws will not be public, in the
sense that the indeterminate law that is publicized could not be the
real basis for judicial decision; and (3) there will be no basis for
concluding that like cases are treated alike, because the 124
very ideal of
legal regularity is empty if law is radically indeterminate.
Moreover, in a democratic society, this means that judges are
allegedly subverting democratic rule by creating the law outside of the
legislative process and that judicial decision making is illegitimate.
Consequently, the indeterminacy thesis puts into question the notion of
the "rule of law."
Contemporary legal theory, however, fails to indicate how law can
be rationally legitimated under the conditions of legal indeterminacy.
There have been three types of unsatisfactory response to legal
indeterminacy. First, some legal theorists have attempted to reject the
legal indeterminacy thesis. For example, Ronald Dworkin maintains that
his interpretive theory of law provides an understanding of law that is
quite determinate so that the law provides "right answers" (even in hard
cases) based on the criteria of "fit" with prior precedent and
"justification" according to the principles of political morality underlying
the law. 125 With respect to fit, he argues that "in a modem, developed,
and complex [legal] system" 126 a tie with respect to fit would be "so rare
as to be exotic. 127 The principles of political morality can further
determine a right answer when the criteria of fit fails so that "[i]f there is
no right answer in a hard case, this must be in virtue of some more
problematic type of indeterminacy or incommensurability in moral
theory."' 128 In the final analysis, Dworkin's interpretive theory of law
constitutes a weak legal formalism, which maintains that the law has

autobiographies containing the sort of material that is recounted in the
autobiographical novel; or opinions annotated, by the judge who writes them,
with elaborate explorations of the background factors in his personal
experience which swayed him in reaching his conclusions. For in the last push,
a judge's decisions are the outcome of his entire life-history.
Id. at 123-24.

124.

Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

AND LEGAL THEORY 489 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
125. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 225, 255 (1986).

Despite much criticism,
Dworkin continues to embrace his right answer thesis. See, e.g., DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN
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1 29
adequate resources to come to determinate results in all cases.
To the contrary, Habermas claims that Dworkin's "coherence theory
of law can avoid the indeterminacy supposedly due to the contradictory
structure of the legal system only at the cost of the theory itself becoming
somehow indeterminate."1 30 Habermas argues that this indeterminacy31
results from what has been referred to as the "ripple effect argument."'1
The ripple effect argument shows that coherency theories require a
reconstruction of the system of legal norms in every hard case which
results in a continuous reconfiguration of the system of legal norms and
amounts to a retroactive interpretation of existing law. Each hard case
thus creates a ripple in the coherent system of legal norms and makes the
entire system of law indeterminate.
In addition, legal positivists usually recognize legal indeterminacy
but fail to explain how judges provide a rational legitimation for the law
in hard cases. For instance, Hart advocates a middle path between
formalism and rule skepticism such that the indeterminacy of the law
allows for "varied types of reasoning which courts characteristically use
in exercising the creative function left to them by the open texture of law
in statute or precedent."132 Hart helps make clear that this open texture
or indeterminacy concerns not only "particular legal rules," but also "the
ultimate criteria of legal validity," which he refers to as "the rule of
recognition."'1 33 With respect to the rule of recognition, this results in a
paradoxical situation where courts are determining the ultimate criteria
of legal validity in the process of deciding whether a particular law is
valid. 134 Hart claims that "the law in such cases is fundamentally
incomplete: it provides no answer to the questions at issue in such cases"

129. Brian Leiter similarly describes Dworkin as a "sophisticated formalist... who
has a rich theory of legal reasoning," but "still remains within the formalist camp because
he sees the law as rationally determinate and he denies that judges have strong discretion
(i.e., he denies that their decisions are not bound by authoritative legal standards)." Brian
Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1146 (1999)
(reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).
See also John P. McCormick, Max Weber and Juirgen Habermas: The Sociology and
Philosophy of Law During Crises of the State, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 297, 324 (1997)
(characterizing Dworkin as embracing a "reformed formalism").
130. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 219 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
131. Id. (citing Kress, supra note 9, at 380-82.
132. HART, supra note 6, at 144. Hart notes that the rule of recognition can be partly,
but never completely, indeterminate. Id. at 148. For example, the United States
Constitution could be indeterminate in some sense, but the rule of recognition conferring
authority (jurisdiction) on the court to exercise its creative powers to settle the ultimate
criteria of validity raises no doubts even though the precise scope of that power may raise
some doubts. See id. at 152.
133. Id. at 148.
134. Id. at 152.
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and that courts must exercise the restricted law-making function which
he refers to as discretion.' 35 As a result; in hard cases, the judge "is
entitled to follow standards or reasons for decision which are not dictated
by the law and may differ
from those followed by other judges faced
' 136
with similar hard cases."
Finally, CLS, feminist legal theory, and critical race theory appear
to give up on a rational legitimation for law altogether and reduce law to
politics.1 37 As a proponent of CLS, Roberto Unger rejects the claims that
law and morality can be based on an apolitical method or procedure of
justification and that the legal system can be objectively defended as
embodying an intelligible moral order. The legal order is merely the
outcome of power struggles or practical compromises. 38 He thus
advocates "the purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal
doctrine to advance leftist aims."' 139 Similarly, Robin West claims that
masculine jurisprudence proceeds from the presupposition of individuals
as essentially separate from one another ("separation thesis"), while
feminist jurisprudence proceeds from the presupposition that individuals
135. Id. at 252.
136. Id. at 273. While denying that legal pragmatism is similar to Hart's legal
positivism, Richard Posner shares Hart's rejection of legal formalism-the idea of "law
as a system of rules and judicial decisions as the result of deduction, with the applicable
rule supplying the major, and the facts of the particular case the minor, premise of
syllogism."
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 19 (2003).
Rather, "[1]egal pragmatism is forward-looking, regarding adherence to past decisions as
a (qualified) necessity rather than as an ethical duty." Id. at 60. Posner emphasizes that
"[tihe ultimate criterion of pragmatic adjudication is reasonableness," which tries to
achieve the "right balance between rule-of-law and case-specific consequences,
continuity and creativity, long-term and short-term, systemic and particular, rule and
standard." Id. at 59, 64. Posner's legal pragmatism thus considers "systemic and not just
case-specific consequences," so that it takes into account "standard rule-of-law virtues of
generality, predictability, and impartiality," but pragmatic judges only rarely "give
controlling weight to systemic consequences as legal formalism does." Id. at 12, 59 &
61.
137. David Kairys argues that:
The lack of required, legally correct rules, methodologies, or results is in part a
function of the limits of language and interpretation, which are subjective and
value laden. More importantly, indeterminacy stems from the reality that the
law usually embraces and legitimizes many or all of the conflicting values and
interests involved in controversial issues and a wide and conflicting array of
"logical" or "reasoned" arguments and strategies of argumentation, without
providing any legally required hierarchy of values or arguments or any required
method for determining which is most important in a particular context. Judges
then make choices, and those choices are most fundamentally value based, or
political.
David Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 4 (David

Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (emphasis added).
138. Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563, 565
(1983).
139. Id. at 567.
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are essentially connected or related to one another. 40 Critical race
theorists have also tried to show that "areas of law ostensibly
designed
14 1
for our benefit often benefit whites even more than blacks."'
Given these responses, the challenge of legal indeterminacy to the
legitimacy of the law has not been met. Legal indeterminacy thus still
constitutes "the key issue in legal scholarship today"'142 because it
potentially calls into question the "rule of law." In other words, legal
indeterminacy raises a crucial normative question that current legal
theory has failed to answer: on what rational normative basis do judges
determine which extra-legal norms are valid and which valid norms are
controlling in deciding hard cases? In the following discussion, I will
show that a process theory of law can address this issue and save the
"rule of law" from illegitimacy.
B.

The OntologicalGap

The second quandary demonstrating the need for a new normative
theory of law stems from the disconnection between legal practice and
legal theory. Steven Smith argues that this disconnect stems from an
ontological gap between the metaphysical presuppositions informing the
practice of law and the "anti-metaphysical animus" informing
contemporary legal theory, which has resulted in "a jurisprudential dead
end."' 143 Smith emphasizes that "[t]he ways in which lawyers and judges
(and even most legal scholars) actually practice and talk about law are
not so different than they were a century ago-or even five centuries
ago.' 44 The contemporary practice of law still presupposes a classical or
religious ontology that maintains the reality of "the law" and that posits
"a sort of working partnership between a divine author and human
legislators."' 145 However, Smith maintains that the classical "account ' has
146
been widely rejected by modem legal thinkers as mere 'superstition.
As a result, the religious ontology presupposed by the practice of law is
contrary to the ontology presupposed by contemporary legal theory.
More specifically, Smith identifies three ontological families which
he labels everyday ontology, scientific ontology, and religious ontology.
140. Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988). See also
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991).
141. Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Sense, 44
VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991). See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, CriticalRace
Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REv. 461 (1993).
142. Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv., 148, 148
(1990).
143. SMITH, supra note 10, at xii.
144. Id. at 1.
145. Id. at 155.
146. Id.
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Smith argues that "'the law' .. . does not square with either the everyday
ontology or the scientific ontology that people in academic settings
regard as axiomatic, at least for professional purposes."' 147 This clarifies
that the ontological gap results because the practice of law presupposes a
religious ontology while contemporary legal theory presupposes a
scientific ontology.
The ontological gap presents a problem because the end result of
accepting a scientific ontology based on "atomic physics and Darwinian
evolution," "is that the religious worldview is inadmissible for purposes
of serious thought."' 148 To support this claim, Smith cites John Searle's
conclusion that an unassailable scientific ontology (i.e., scientific
materialism) invalidates religious ontology.149 Smith's argument means
that legal practice is based on a defective or faculty religious ontology
that lacks "academic" credibility. Given this analysis, the question
becomes whether the ontological gap between legal practice and legal
theory constitutes an unfathomable chasm that cannot be traversed or
whether it can be navigated by reforming centuries of legal practice or by
positing a new ontology for legal theory.
IV. Whitehead's Telos for Law and Process Scholarship on Law and
Human Rights
Whitehead's Teleology of Beauty and Treatment of Law

A.

Contrary to Smith's conclusion, Whitehead's metaphysics or
speculative philosophy shows that "atomic physics and Darwinian
evolution" are not inconsistent with a religious ontology. John Cobb
emphasizes that Whitehead's speculative philosophy blends together the
new insights in physics (e.g., "relativity and quantum theory") with
William James's new philosophical insights (e.g., radical empiricism) to
challenge the pervasive "scientific materialism and the Cartesian Ego."' 50
Similarly, David Ray Griffin clarifies that Whitehead's philosophy is
part of "constructive or revisionary postmodemism" that "rejects not
science as such but only that scientism in which the data of the modem
natural sciences are alone allowed to contribute to the construction of our
worldview." 15' At the same time, Whitehead maintains that God is a
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.

SMITH, supranote 10, at 34.
Id.
John B. Cobb, Jr., Alfred North Whitehead, in FOUNDERS OF CONSTRUCTIVE
POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY 165, 165-66 (David Ray Griffin, John B. Cobb, Jr., Marcus P.
Ford, Pete A. Y. Gunter, & Peter Ochs eds., 1993).
151. David Ray Griffin, Introduction to SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern
Thought, in FOUNDERS OF CONSTRUCTIVE POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 150, at
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necessary part of his metaphysics because God "shares with every new
creation its actual world; and the concrescent creature is objectified 1in
52
God as a novel element in God's objectification of that actual world."'
God is crucial for the creative advance of the universe because God lures
the world toward the categorical imperative of maximizing beauty or the
"intensity of feeling ...in the immediate subject, and... in the relevant
future." 153 Whitehead's metaphysics thus unifies scientific ontology and
religious ontology and presents the possibility of closing the ontological
gap between legal practice and legal theory.
Furthermore, Whitehead maintains that maximizing beauty is
categorical or universal because "[t]he teleology of the Universe is
directed to the production of Beauty."' 154 Beauty or unity-in-diversity
entails achieving both a sense of order (harmony or an absence of mutual
inhibition among various prehensions) and a raised intensity of feelings
(complexity or a synthesis of contrasting feelings). 155 Because this
transcendent (a priori) telos is universally applicable to all experience
(human and nonhuman), humans as self-conscious experiencing agents
should direct their actions to maximize beauty. Consequently, normative
legal claims should maximize beauty (unity-in-diversity) no less than
moral claims and, as I will argue below, Whitehead's metaphysics
requires a natural law theory of law based on the telos of beauty.
Although Whitehead's metaphysics provides great potential for
closing the ontological gap with a new theory of natural law,
Whitehead's discussion of law and jurisprudence offer little explicit
guidance on how this can be done. In Adventures of Ideas, he refers to
law several times but mainly as an example of how it relates to the
advance of civilization. For example, Whitehead briefly mentions
156
essential human rights, the "alliance of philosophy, law, and religion,"
"jurisprudence,"' 157 "Anglo-American Common Law,"'15 8 and "our legal
ideas" 159 in various passages without discussing law or legal theory in
With the exception of slavery (discussed below),
any detail. 160
viii. Zhihe Wang also provides a very helpful analysis of the aspects of Whitehead's
Philosophy that justify characterizing Whitehead as a constructive "postmodem thinker."
See generally Zhihe Wang, The Postmodern Dimension of Whitehead's Philosophy and
Its Relevance, in WHITEHEAD AND CHINA: RELEVANCE AND RELATIONSHIPS, supra note
98, at 173-87.
152.

WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 100, at 345.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 27.
WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS,

supra note 19, at 265.

Id. at 252.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 19.
Id. at44.
WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS,

Id. at 65.

supra note 19, at 63.
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Whitehead's other references to "law" in Adventures of Ideas focus
primarily on the "notions of Law" relevant to science and technology
(i.e., physical laws of nature) and the cosmological ideas they
presuppose. 161
Despite his focus on theoretical or speculative reasoning, Whitehead
16 2
argues that the "function of Reason" "is to promote the art of life.'
Whitehead clarifies that practical reasoning "is the enlightenment of
More
purpose; within limits, it renders purpose effective."1 63
to
live
urge:
(i)
to
live,
(ii)
that
it
has
"a
three-fold
specifically, he states
well, (iii) to live better. In fact, the art of life isfirst to be alive, secondly
to be alive in a satisfactory way, and thirdly to acquire an increase in
satisfaction."'' 64 In other words, Whitehead maintains that the telos of
beauty leads to a different form for practical reasoning. Unlike the
Greeks who thought the final ends for humans were fixed, the end is not
just to live well. There is also an imperative toward the creative advance
of a higher form of perfection-"the adventure of living better." 165 This
pragmatic function of reason presupposes a notion of final causation and
seeks to make that end effective. In a process perspective, the end is
never finally realized because there are always higher levels of perfection
to be realized in the future.
In the Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead gives the example of the
"growth of the idea of the essential rights of human beings, arising from
their sheer humanity" or the humanitarian ideal to demonstrate how the
aspiration to live better can surpass the aspiration to live well.1 66 He
points out that "Freedom and Equality constitute an inevitable
presupposition for modem political thought.., while Slavery was a
corresponding presupposition for the ancients."1 67 For example, despite
the great democratic insights of the Greek and Roman civilizations, "it
was universally assumed that a large slave population was required to
perform services which were unworthy to engage the activities of a fully
civilized man." 168 For the ancients, slavery was a presupposition
consistent with democracy while modem political thought presupposes
freedom and equality. While certain technological advances "weakened
the necessity for slavery," its eradication required the "combined

161.

Id. at 103-39.

WHITEHEAD, THE FUNCTION OF REASON 4 (Beacon 1958)
WHITEHEAD, THE FUNCTION OF REASON].
163. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 100, at 37.

162.

164.

WHITEHEAD, THE FUNCTION OF REASON, supra note 162, at 8.

165.

Id. at 19.

166.

WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS, SUpra

167.
168.

Id.
Id. at 12-13.

note 19, at 13.
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influence of philosophy, law, and religion."' 69 In the West, Whitehead
credits the moral energy of "the impracticable ethics of Christianity," the
philosophical generality of outlook Platonic philosophy, and the
"constructive ability" of law for "the evolution from the notion of society
based upon servitude to that of society based upon individual
freedom."' 70 Social reform thus requires an "alliance of philosophy, law,
and religion."17
B.

Process Scholarshipon Law and Human Rights

Despite Whitehead's limited treatment of law, Jay Tidmarsh has
provided great insight into the implications of process thought for legal
theory. In contrast to the focus in this Article on the normative
implications of process thought for law, his focus has been more on
descriptive jurisprudence than on normative jurisprudence. 72 In A
Process Theory of Torts, Tidmarsh maintains "that torts must be
understood as a system in perpetual process-forever indefinite and
infinitely malleable in its precise theoretical, doctrinal, and practical
' 73
manifestations-yet ultimately bounded in its possibilities."'
"Normatively, the fact that all states of perfection will perish suggests
that a tort system that wishes to survive must reject all conceptualist
efforts to hitch the system to a particular natural law, corrective justice,
or efficiency theory."' 174 In Whitehead's Metaphysics and the Law,
Tidmarsh further provides a comprehensive introduction to Whitehead's
metaphysics and suggests some principles like perfection, order, and
harmony, as "a framework that could be used to determine that which
' 75
best achieves Beauty in certain instances, and that which does not."'
He also suggests that "middle principles" could be developed from
Whitehead's metaphysics which "could suggest in general terms the sorts
of legal structures, theories, rules, and practices that best suit particular
occasions of experience, and thus are most conducive to the achievement

169. Id. at 27, 26.
170. Id. at 42, 26.
171. WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS, SUpra note 19, at 19.
172. Descriptive jurisprudence helps us understand how analytically we can talk
about law as something distinct from other forms of practical reasoning, such as morality
and politics. Descriptive jurisprudence also describes how the normative justification
occurs in the legal system. By contrast, normative jurisprudence provides a justification
or legitimation of the law and the legal system (including judicial decision making).
173. Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313, 1317
(1994).
174. Id.at 1418.
175. Jay Tidmarsh, Whitehead's Metaphysics and the Law: A Dialogue, 62 ALB. L.
REV. 1, 89 (1998).
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of Beauty." 76
Recent work on process thought and human rights begins to derive
middle principles from Whitehead's metaphysics that give further insight
into how the telos of beauty might provide a normative theory of law.
Howard Vogel has explored the importance of process thought for
reinvigorating the sense of vocation among lawyers through an
understanding of "law-as-process-with-a-purpose., 177 Recently, he has
also begun to explore the importance of process thought for international
human rights 178 and constitutional interpretation. 179 With respect to the
later, Vogel has argued that "[t]he legitimacy of constitutional
interpretation is to be found in the growth and nurture of participatory
democracy, as an expression of the principle of internal relations, seeking
community large enough to embrace the elements 18
of
discord in our
0
union.'
perfect
'more
a
within
contrast
as
experience,
With respect to human rights, both Douglas Sturm and George
Pickering have set forth relational or process perspectives on property
rights. 8 1 Sturm has been particularly responsible for advancing the
implications of process thought for human rights. 182 He attempts to
preserve the "idea of human rights" because of its "normative insight
about the meaning of life." However, Sturm replaces the individualistic
ontology of "classical western liberalism" with a process-based
"communitarian political ontology," which "is more relational and
ecological, even organic, in character." 183 Sturm further advocates a
176. Id.
177. Howard J. Vogel, The Terrible Bind of the Lawyer in the Modern World: The
Problem of Hope, the Question of Identity, and the Recovery of Meaning in the Practice
of Law, 32 SETON HALL L. REv. 152, 183 (2001).
178. Howard J. Vogel, Refraining Rights from the Ground Up: The Contribution of
the U.N. Law of Self-Determination to Recovering the Principleof Sociability on the Way
to a Relational Theory of InternationalHuman Rights, 20 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L. J.
443 (2006).
179. Howard J. Vogel, The Possibilities of American Constitutional Law in a
FracturedWorld: A Relational Approach to Legal Hermeneutics, 83 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 789 (2006).
180. Id. at 824 (emphasis added).
181. George W. Pickering, Property Rights: Another Relational Perspective", in
ECONOMIC LIFE: PROCESS INTERPRETATIONS AND CRITICAL RESPONSES 79 (W. Widick
Schroeder & Franklin I. Gamwell eds., 1988); Douglas Sturm, Property: A Relational
Perspective, in ECONOMIC LIFE: PROCESS INTERPRETATIONS AND CRITICAL RESPONSES; id.
at 29.
182. In honor of Sturm's contributions and his retirement from teaching at Bucknell
University, "the Center for Process Studies held a conference April 17-19, 1999 called
'Human Rights in a Process Perspective."' Randall C. Morris, Focus Introduction:
Human Rights in a Process Perspective: Conversations with Douglas Sturm, 33.2
PROCESS STUDIES 195 (2004). The "task of the conference" was "to take a critical look at
the principle of human rights" from the perspective of process thought. Id. at 196.
183.

DOUGLAS STURM,
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"jurisprudence of solidarity" rather than a "jurisprudence of
individuality."' 184 In a jurisprudence of solidarity, "the driving passion of
law is not so much to protect the individual against trespass as it is to
create a quality of social interaction conducive to the flourishing of a
vibrant community of life across the world."'185 In other words, Sturm
argues that "human rights are of greatest importance as a form of
empowerment, enabling people, as individuals and in their associations,
186
to participate effectively in and through political community."'
In addition, Franklin Gamwell's work provides great insight and
guidance in determining what particular human rights follow from the
theistic telos of beauty, which he refers to as the comprehensive divine
purpose or the "maximal unity-in-diversity."' 187 In Democracy on
Purpose, Gamwell attempts "to articulate the [comprehensive] divine
purpose in terms of the principles of justice."'' 88 He arrives at these
principles by supplementing process thought with the work Karl-Otto
Apel and Jiirgen Habermas. Based on Apel and Habermas, Gamwell
makes a transcendental argument supporting "the principle of
communicative respect," which "is a meta-ethical presupposition of
every claim to moral validity. ' ' 189 The principle of communicative
respect provides that "individuals are morally bound to treat each other
as potential participants in moral discourse."'90 This principle is a
formative principle because it remains neutral to all substantive
principles and provides that moral disagreement should be resolved by
the social practice of argumentation. 19'
Gamwell argues that the constitution must establish formative rights
to ensure a "full and free political discourse.' 9 2 Democracy requires that
political association is both full, such that all principles or norms,
whether formative or substantive, are subject to contest, and free, such
that all individuals participating in this political association have equal
rights to participation. However, the rights in the constitution must be
RELATIONALITY

19-20 (1998) [hereinafter

STURM, SOLIDARITY AND SUFFERING];

see also

Douglas Sturm, The Idea of Human Rights: A CommunitarianPerspective, 23.4 PROCESS
STUDIES 238 (1994).
184. STURM, SOLIDARITY AND SUFFERING, supra note 183, at 10.
185. Id. at 11.
186. Id. at 18.
187. Franklin I. Gamwell, The Purposeof Human Rights, 29.2 PROCESS STUDIES 322,
338 (2000), reprinted in 22 Miss. C. L. REv. 239 (2003) [hereinafter Gamwell, The
Purpose of Human Rights].
188. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE: JUSTICE AND THE REALITY OF
GOD 149 (2000) [hereinafter GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE].
189. Id. at 223.
190. Id. at 197.
191. Id. at 198-99.
192. Id. at 212-13.
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solely formative because "[a]ny constitutional provision of substantive
rights would, in other words, arrest a full and free political discourse by
stipulating that citizens as participants in it explicitly accept some
conception of good human association." 193 Rather, the full and free
debate essential to democracy concerns precisely the question of which
conception of the good human association should inform the substantive
rights prescribed by law.
In order to institutionalize this debate, Gamwell argues that the
constitution should include formative rights protecting both private and
public liberties. Private liberties protect the prerequisites for discourse
such as the right to personal property and the right to contract. 19 4 Public
liberties "govern actual participation in discourse" and include rights
such as due process, equal protection of the law, free speech, and
freedom of association.' 95 In addition, some liberties, like religious
freedom, are both public and private. As a private liberty, religious
freedom protects the "freedom of conscience," and as a public liberty, it
ensures that all conceptions of the comprehensive good are subject to
contest. 96 While these private and public constitutional rights remain
formative, statutory legislation must make substantive determinations
concerning issues such as the extent of personal property rights, the legal
constraints on the free market, and public education. 97 There is no
guarantee that these decisions will facilitate the free and full debate, but
the private and public formative constitutional rights ensure that these
decisions are always subject to contestation. Individuals may challenge
these substantive prescriptions as well as the conception of good human
association that they endorse.
Despite the formative nature of the constitution, Gamwell maintains
that "the principles of justice depend on a comprehensive [divine]
purpose" and "that the [comprehensive] divine purpose for human life
implies a democratic principle.' ' 198 To support this claim, he argues for
"the compound characterofjustice."' 99 On the one hand, the substantive
principle or principles of justice imply the formative principle of
communicative respect, which is the meta-ethical presupposition of
moral validity.
On the other hand, the formative principle of
communicative respect implies a comprehensive purpose.
This
comprehensive purpose provides the basis for the substantive principles
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

199.

GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE, supra note 188, at 221.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 235.
Id.at 216.
GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE, supra note 188, at 181.
Id. at 232.
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of justice that are required to resolve moral and political decisions.
In addition, Gamwell summarizes his compound theory of justice as
general emancipation with a principle: "Maximize the general conditions
of emancipation to which there is equal access."200 He supports this
substantive principle by demonstrating that it has a compound character
and that it follows from the comprehensive divine purpose. He then
summarizes this compound conception of justice by a set of democratic
principles:
1. The political association should be constituted as a full and free
discourse, providing equal public liberties and, therefore, equal
private liberties.
2. The political order should
A. maximize equality of public access, providing for all
conditions of basic emancipation, and
B. maximize the general
conditions of emancipation to which
2 1
there is equal access.

0

Although 2B is the inclusive principle of justice as emancipation and
implies the others and their priority, the formative principle in 1 and the
substantive principle in 2A are democratically prior. Together these
principles define the compound character of justice as general
emancipation. Moreover, "this statement of principles for a conception
of human rights backed by neoclassical metaphysics" is "inseparable
from a comprehensive [divine] good" and articulates "a universal or
natural moral law" that should determine the activities of the state.20 2
V.

Process Natural Law

A.

A New Theory of NaturalLaw

Michael Moore's definition of natural law theory supports
Gamwell's characterization of his process-based compound theory of
justice as a universal or natural moral law. Moore argues that a "natural
law theory" contains "two essential theses: (1) there are objective moral
truths" (moral realistthesis); "and (2) the truth of any legal proposition
necessarily depends, at least in part, on the truth of some corresponding

200.
201.
202.

Id. at 295.
Id.at3ll.
Gamwell, The Purpose of Human Rights, supra note 188, at 343-44.
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moral proposition(s)" (relational thesis).20 3 With respect to the moral
realist thesis, process metaphysics clearly establishes both a rationally
necessary teleology of beauty (i.e., comprehensive divine good) and the
formative and substantive rights it implies as objective moral truths.
Similarly, with respect to the relational thesis, Sturm notes that
Gamwell's formative rights are "unqualified rights, since they compose
the necessary, even if not sufficient, foundation of a democratic political
process., 20 4 In other words, the validity of any law in a democratic
political system must be consistent with these formative rights. In
addition, substantive rights must be "rooted in an overarching moral
criterion that both authorizes the formative rights already indicated and
provides a normative measure for the evaluation of contestable policy
proposals. ' '20 5 Even though formative rights should be constitutionally
guaranteed and substantive rights should be left to the legislature, both
formative and substantive rights are accountable to the telos of
maximizing beauty for their legitimacy. Consequently, the telos of
maximizing beauty and the formative and substantive rights it implies
represent objective moral truths that determine the legitimacy of any
legal proposition.
Beyond Moore's two essential theses, process natural law theory
has both similarities to and differences from classical natural law theory.
As noted by Cicero, classical natural law maintains that:
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal
application, unchanging and everlasting.. . there will not be different
laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future,
but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and
all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us
all, for20he
is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing
6
judge.

With respect to formative rights, the classical notion of fixed,
unchanging natural laws may have some relevance to process natural law
theory. For example, the universal formative rights noted above (e.g.,
the right to personal property, the right to contract, due process, equal
protection, etc.) should be protected in all constitutions.
On the other hand, the realization of the universal telos of
203. Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revised, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2424, 2425 (199192).
204. Douglas Sturm, Taking Human Rights Seriously: Relationality Relationship and
Subjectivity, 33.2 PROCESS STUDIES 237, 253 (2004) [hereinafter Sturm, Taking Human
Rights Seriously].
205. Id.
206. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE REPUBLICA, III, xxii, 33 (Clinton Walker Keyes,
trans., Loeb Classical Library 1928).
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maximizing beauty (including the implied substantive right to general
emancipation), is always relative to the particular circumstances. For
example, Whitehead claims that the details of all moral codes "are
relative to the social circumstances of the immediate environment" and
that there is a transcendent "aim of social perfection" (i.e., beauty) for all
these moral codes.20 7 Conduct in one environment produces a measure
of harmony, but in another environment, it is destructively degrading.
"Each society has its own type of perfection., 20 8 Similarly, the
substantive laws in any particular country should embody legal norms
which are relevant to its particular environment and which aim at
promoting the evolution of that environment towards its proper
perfection. Consequently, we must continually "seek for some highly
general principles underlying all such codes. Such generalities should
reflect the very notions of the harmonizing of harmonies, and of
particular individual actualities as the sole authentic reality. These are
the principles of the generality of harmony," (i.e., order), "and of the
importance of the individual" (i.e., increased intensity of feeling), which
together constitute beauty.20 9
The telos of beauty, however, is never fully realized, which means
that substantive laws and "[m]orals consist in the aim at the ideal. 210
Aiming at the ideal does not mean achieving a static state of affairs, but
instead striving for creative advance. While the telos of beauty is
universal, the unique circumstances of each society in question determine
which state of affairs will maximize beauty in that particular legal
system. Except for the telos of beauty and the formative and substantive
rights it implies, the ends of the law do not include any fixed and
unchanging substantive rights or state of affairs as they would in
classical natural law and natural rights theory. Thus, the substantive
rights and regulations must be continually modified to facilitate the ideal
social perfection that is relevant to the current societal circumstances.
B.

A CulturallySensitive Conception of the Rule of Law

The telos of beauty in process natural law supports a more flexible
and culturally sensitive conception of the rule of law. As a theory of
natural law, process natural law requires a substantive conception of rule
of law similar to the usual Western conception because it also includes
formal legality, individual rights, and democracy. Although form and
substance are never completely separate, formal legality would require
207.

WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS, supra note 19, at 269, 290-91.

208. Id. at 291.
209. Id. at 292.
210. Id. at 269.
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the protection of the universal formative rights noted above in all
constitutions. 211 In addition, Gamwell's compound conception of justice
entails a set of democratic principles including the tenet that "political
association should be constituted as a full and free discourse, providing
equal public liberties and, therefore, equal private liberties. '2 12
With respect to individual rights, Gamwell argues that identifying
which substantive rights to protect is always a matter of debate and
should be accomplished through the legislature.2 13 Recall that realizing
the universal telos of maximizing beauty and the implied substantive
right to general emancipation is always relative to particular
circumstances. The content and interpretation of the individual rights
protected in different countries depend on the perfection best suited for
their historical and cultural circumstances. A process conception of the
rule of law thus allows for some differences with respect to the
interpretation and instantiation of individual rights in different countries
like the U.S. and China.
For example, Doug Sturm offers an amendment to Gamwell's
understanding of human rights by arguing for the inclusion of the "right
to subsistence" in the Constitution.1 4 Strum argues that "the right to
subsistence" (which includes economic and social rights) is inextricably
interdependent with the "right to participation.,' 2 15 Sturm clarifies that
"[w]ithout a guarantee of effective participation in the public forum,
one's economic condition is likely to suffer," and "[w]ithout the
economic wherewithal to provide for at least minimal sustenance, basic
education, and some degree of social mobility, one's participation is
public life is likely to be minimalized. ' '216 In other words, process
natural law may also support an alternative conception of the rule of law
that would be classified in the category of "thickest" substantive

211. See supra text accompanying notes 192-97.
212. GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE, supra note 188, at 311.
213. Id. at215-16.
214. Sturm notes that "[i]n important respects, Gamwell's understanding of the role
and importance of human rights and mine.. . converge," but Sturm offers an amendment
proposing that "the right to subsistence" (which includes economic and social rights)
should be added to the "right to participation" on the list of formative rights. Sturm,
Taking Human Rights Seriously, supra note 204, at 251, 254. Gamwell responds by
noting that he concurs in Sturm's claim that the "right of subsistence" is important, but
maintains that "substantive rights are too important to be constitutionally stipulated."
Franklin I. Gamwell, Response to Douglas Sturm, 33 PROCESS STUDIES 258, 261 (2004).
Gamwell further clarifies that putting substantive rights in the constitution would be
"inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people" because "each citizen must be sovereign
over her or his assessment of every politically relevant claim, in the sense that neither the
constitution nor the state properly stipulates that assessment." Id. at 260-61.
215. Id. at 253-54.
216. Id. at252.
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conceptions because it adds social welfare provisions to individual rights.
The debate between Gamwell and Sturm highlights that process
natural law may support more than one conception of the rule of law.
Rather than imperialistically imposing a Western conception of the rule
of law (formal legality + individual rights + democracy), process natural
law supports a conception of the rule of law that takes into account the
important cultural differences among countries like the U.S. and China.
With China's "socialist democracy" and "socialist legal system,"2" 7 one
possible development would be to emphasize the social welfare
requirements mentioned by Sturm in addition to, or more strongly than,
Western notions of individual rights. For example, China may impose
substantial taxes on Chinese business to help alleviate the growing
disparity of economic development between urban and rural parts of
China. China may further utilize forms of wealth redistribution to
protect the right of subsistence that may be contrary to Western notions
of property rights. Moreover, China's socialist democracy may help
2 18
China circumvent interpreting "the right as well as the duty to work"
under Article 42 of the Chinese Constitution as a vehicle for prohibiting
health and safety regulations protecting workers like those found
unconstitutional during the Lochner Era in the United States. 219 In other
words, the socialist influence on China may allow China to pursue an
ideal social perfection that avoids the harsher aspects of the industrial
revolution suffered in the West.
On the other hand, this culturally sensitive notion of the rule of law
should not be interpreted as a form of cultural relativism. For example,
some women may be concerned that the renewed emphasis on the
Confucian tradition will mean that the advances for women will in China
succumb to the reinstitution of Confucius's (551-479 BC) feudal notion
of the place of women in society. In addressing current concerns that
217. XIAN FA, supra note 21, at pmbl.
218. Id. at art. 42.
219. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the United States Supreme Court
held that New York legislation limiting bakers' work to sixty hours a week and ten hours
per day was as an unconstitutional restriction of liberty of contract protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Constitutional law scholar Erwin
Chemerinsky notes that, during the Lochner Era, "[i]t is estimated that almost 200 state
laws were declared unconstitutional as violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment" and additional federal laws were held unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 616 (3d ed. 2006). By most accounts, the Lochner Era ended
when the United States Supreme Court gave up on vigorously protecting the liberty of
contract (i.e., substantive economic due process) in cases such as West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), where it upheld a minimum wage law for women as a
reasonable restraint on liberty. See PAUL BREST ET AL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 510-13 (Aspen, 5th ed. 2006).
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"Confucianism spells authority and discipline, limiting individual
freedom, and strengthening the state," Wm. Theodore de Bary notes the
feminist critique of Confucian thought in the early 1900s by Ho Shen. °
Ho Shen maintained that "Confucian learning is marked by its devotion
to honoring men and denigrating women" so that "women have duties
but no rights. 'aa She further argues that Confucianism venerated "men
like gods while condemning women to the hells" and that "Confucianism
marks the beginning of justifications for polygamy [for men] and chastity
[for women]. 222
While I am not suggesting this is the only way to interpret
Confucian thought on the role of women, this feminist critique raises
valid concerns that tailoring the rule of law to Confucian cultural
traditions may diminish the equality of women in China. The culturally
sensitive aspect of a process conception of law actually would not
support such retrogression in women's equality. As emphasized by
Sturm, Gamwell's formative rights are "unqualified rights, since they
compose the necessary, even if not sufficient, foundation of a democratic
political process.' 223 In addition, Gamwell summarizes his compound
theory of justice as general emancipation with a principle: "Maximize
the general conditions of emancipation to which there is equal
access."224 Gamwell makes the protection of equality clear in each of the
three democratic principles that specify "equal public liberties," "equal
private liberties," and "maximizing equality of public access. ' 225
Equality is thus beyond cultural negotiation and would not yield to any
anti-female Confucian notions.
Also, this feminist critique of Confucian thought could just as well
be made against key Western thinkers, like Aristotle, who wrongly
thought women had a diminished capacity. 226 Confucius's blindness
regarding women does not mean that other aspects of his thought are not
220. Wm. Theodore de Bary, Introduction, in CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 82, at 1.
221. Id. at 3 (quoting Ho CHEN, Nuzi Fuchou lun, in TIANYI BAO, no.3 (10), 7-13
(Peter Zarrow trans.)).
222. Id. at 2 (quoting CHEN, TIANYI BAO, supra note 221, at 7-13).
223. Sturm, Taking Human Rights Seriously, supra note 204, at 253.
224. GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE, supra note 188, at 294 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 311. See also text accompanying note 201.
226. Jean Bethke Elshtain notes that Aristotle excluded certain categories of persons
(e.g., women, slaves, mechanics, and laborers) from politics because he did not think they
had the rational capacity required for ruling or citizenship. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN,
PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 47 (2d ed.
1993). For example, "Aristotle's women were idiots in the Greek sense of the word,
persons who either could not or did not participate in the polis or the 'good' of public life,
individuals without a public voice, condemned to silence as their appointed sphere and
condition." Id.
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continuing to influence Chinese society in a positive way and should be
taken into account when implementing the rule of law. Jean Bethke
Elshtain similarly argues that while rejecting Aristotle's erroneous view
of the diminished capacity of women and other categories of persons, she
argues that we can still adopt Aristotle's notion of politics as a form of
action and his claims about the relationship between the individual good
and the good of the state.227 Moreover, while process natural law
supports some flexibility and cultural sensitivity in implementing the rule
of law, certain notions like equality between men and women are not
subject to cultural negotiation. Thus, process natural law mitigates some
of the cultural bias in exporting the rule of law abroad and allows for the
law to reflect some "local knowledge," but at the same time, it considers
other principles like equality to be trans-cultural in nature.
C. Legal Indeterminacyand Closing the Ontological Gap
Process natural law also responds to the two major threats to the
rule of law at home-legal indeterminacy and the ontological gap
between legal theory and practice. Contrary to contemporary legal
theories, legal indeterminacy does not present an issue of illegitimacy for
process natural law theory or threaten the rule of law. Rather than
reducing law to an act of will (e.g., legal positivism) or an ideological
gesture (e.g., critical legal studies), process natural law theory claims that
the law has a rational basis. In hard cases, even though the expressed
will of the majority (e.g., statutes) and the decisions of their judicial
representatives (e.g., case law) are indeterminate, judges still have
resources to rationally legitimate their decisions. Judges can rely on the
telos of beauty and the formative and substantive rights following from it
to determine how hard cases should be decided. Given that the validity
of the law is already determined by the telos of beauty and these rights,
judges are warranted in relying on them directly whether the
indeterminacy is intentional (e.g., reasonable person standard) or
unintentional (e.g., conflicting laws). Furthermore, process natural law
does not mean that inflexible, antiquated natural laws will be imposed on
contemporary society. Rather, judges must determine what maximizes
beauty in accordance with the circumstance of the case and the social
perfection possible within that society. As a result, under a process
theory of natural law, legal indeterminacy does not result in illegitimacy
but presents an occasion for judges to rely directly on the rational
foundation of the law (i.e., the telos of beauty and the formative and
substantive rights it implies) to resolve disputes.
227.

Id. at 53.
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In addition, no ontological gap exists between process natural law
theory and the practice of law. Whitehead's metaphysics unifies
scientific ontology and religious ontology. There is no distinction
between the religious ontology presupposed by the practice of law and
the "scientific" ontology presupposed by legal theory. Whitehead's
theistic teleology makes sense of the religious presuppositions of legal
practice regarding "the reality of 'the law"' and "a sort of working
228
partnership between a divine author and human legislators.5
Similarly, Whitehead's metaphysics refutes the "scientific" ontology of
contemporary legal theory, which presupposes that the end result of
accepting a scientific ontology based on "atomic physics and Darwinian
evolution," "is that the religious worldview is inadmissible for purposes
of serious thought., 229 Consequently, process natural law theory solves
the two most pressing issues of contemporary legal theory by providing
for the legitimation of law despite its indeterminacy and by closing the
ontological gap between legal theory and legal practice.
D.

The EmpiricalSide of ProcessNaturalLaw

Given the abstract nature of the telos of beauty and the human rights
implied by it, it is far from clear how a process theory of natural law
provides a legitimation of judges' decisions in hard cases. These abstract
principles clearly rule out some options and provide general guidelines
for practical deliberation. However, the principles of process natural law
do not provide a deductive mechanism for resolving hard cases and are
indeterminate when it comes to resolving particular disputes. Judges
must still choose from the permissible options.
Unlike classical natural law theory, process natural law involves
more than top-down reasoning from the abstract principles of process
natural law. Process natural law also provides justification for judges
reasoning from the bottom-up. Judges are permitted to rely on their
intuitions about how these abstract rational principles ought to resolve
hard cases. Judicial intuitions constitute a direct application of principles
of process natural law to the facts and positive law relevant to a
particular case. This conclusion seems to be supported by Whitehead's
similar conclusion with respect to practical reasoning in ethics. He
claims that "ethical intuitions are a direct application of metaphysical
doctrine for the determination of practice. 23 ° Judicial intuitions thus
complement the purely rational approach to judicial decision making
based on the principles of process natural law.
228.
229.
230.

SMITH, supra note 10, at 155.
Id. at 34.
WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS, supra note 19, at 18.
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This bottom-up approach is the empirical side of process thought as
it relates to practical reasoning. For Whitehead, experience is primary
while rational theoretical constructions are an abstraction from the
fullness of experience. He claims that the apprehension of a vague and
inarticulate causation is primary while consciousness is secondary.2 3' In
other words, what we are conscious of is a reduction of that vague sense
of causation. The principles of process natural law are an abstraction
from more inclusive experience of the telos of beauty and its relation to
the facts and positive laws relevant to particular cases. Consequently, a
process theory of natural law should take into account the inclusiveness
and primacy of experience as well as the principles of process natural
law.
Whitehead, however, does not provide much insight on how the
empirical side of process philosophy relates to practical reasoning. To
supplement Whitehead's account, I will draw on William James's
pragmatic empiricism. Although Whitehead rejects James's denigration
of rational metaphysical speculation, Whitehead agrees with James about
the primacy and inclusiveness of experience. Whitehead credits James
with "the inauguration of a new stage of philosophy" because of his
rejection of Cartesian dualism. 232 Whitehead further cites James's
empiricism approvingly, 233 and he credits James with properly234protesting
"against the dismissal of experience in the interest of system.,
James's pragmatic empiricism claims that our experience includes
the conjunctive and disjunctive relations between things as well as the
things themselves.2 35 The "parts of experience" are held together "by
relations that are themselves part of experience. '236 In other words, no
"trans-empirical connective support" holds the universe together. 37
James refers to this inclusive view of experience as the vast wholeness or
fullness of experience.238 Pragmatic empiricism takes both logic (or
231. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 100, at 173, 178.
232. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD, supra note 102, at 143.
233. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 100, at 68.
234. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT 2, 3 (Free Press 1968) (1938).
235. William James, A World of Pure Experience, in ESSAYS INRADICAL EMPIRICISM
39, 44-52 (Ralph Barton Perry, ed., U. of Neb. Press 1996) (1912) [hereinafter James, A
World of Pure Experience]; William James, The Meaning of Truth, in PRAGMATISM AND
OTHER ESSAYS 138, 138 (1963) [hereinafter James, Meaning of Truth]; William James,
Pragmatism's Conception of Truth, in ESSAYS IN PRAGMATISM 159, 165-66 (Alburey
Castell ed., 1948) [hereinafter James, Pragmatism's Conception of Truth]. For a more
extended treatment of James's pragmatic empiricism and its implications for legal
reasoning, see Mark C. Modak-Truran, A PragmaticJustification of the JudicialHunch,
35 U. RICH. L. REv. 55, 71-83 (2001).
236. James, Meaningof Truth, supra note 235, at 138.
237. Id.
238. As Whitehead recognized, James claimed that: "Your acquaintance with reality
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theory) and the external senses as valid experiences. Rationalism limits
itself to logic (theory), and empiricism limits itself to the external senses.
James's pragmatic empiricism, however, includes all experience,
physical and mental, 239
which is one of the reasons James refers to it as
"radical empiricism.,
With respect to practical reasoning, James identifies two factors that
discipline or justify practical decisions based on the fullness of
experience. First, James says that we will recognize answers to practical
problems as we do everything else, "by certain subjective marks." These
subject marks include "a strong feeling of ease, peace, rest" and a
transition from a puzzled or perplexed state to a state of rational
comprehension.2 40 James calls these subjective marks the "Sentiment of
Rationality." He argues that we experience the justification
of the
241
decision and feel a lack of need to justify or explain it.
To fully understand James's radical proposal to practical decision
making, the metaphysics of radical empiricism needs further exploration.
First, it is essential to understand that James's metaphysics, like
Whitehead's, radically rejects the subject/object split. Hillary Putnam
has noted that since Descartes, most philosophers have argued that "in
perception we receive 'impressions' that are immaterial, totally
grows literally by buds or drops of perception. Intellectually and on reflection you can
divide these into components, but as immediately given, they come totally or not at all."
WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 100, at 68 (quoting WILLIAM JAMES,
SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY, Ch. X (U. of Neb. Press 1996).
239. James, Meaning of Truth, supra note 235, at 138; James, A World of Pure
Experience, supra note 235, at 41-44.
240. WILLIAM JAMES, The Sentiment of Rationality, in ESSAYS IN PRAGMATISM 3
(Alburey Castell ed., 1948) [hereinafter James, Sentiment of Rationality]. Aristotle also
claimed that judging was not merely a deductive process of going from universals to
particulars, but that it involved a kind of perception (called the "eye of the soul")
whereby the practically wise judge could relate the universals to the particulars.
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics 1144a:29-30 (William D. Ross trans., rev. by J.L.
Ackrill & J.O. Urmson), in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Jonathan Barnes ed.,
rev. Oxford trans., 1984). See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE
LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 86 (1995); Mark Modak-Truran, Corrective
Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 249 (2000) (positing
Pericles as the ideal Aristotelian judge and arguing that corrective justice is a moral virtue
of the judge (rather than a formal, substantive, or political conception of freedom or
equality) that cannot be fully understood without specifying its relationship to the
intellectual virtue of practical wisdom and the telos of the good life).
Similarly, Joseph Hutcheson proposed the Hunch Theory of judicial decisionmaking
to support judges relying on their hunches or intuitions in deciding cases. See Joseph C.
Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929); see also Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic
Justificationof the JudicialHunch, supra note 235, at 58 (arguing that William James's
pragmatism provides a compelling epistemological justification for the Hutcheson's
Hunch Theory ofjudicial decision making and saves the hunch from arbitrariness).
241. Id. at 4.
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different-separated by a metaphysical gulf-in fact from all the
material objects we normally claim to perceive; and from the character of
our internal mental impressions we infer how things are in the external
physical world., 242 In other words, we first have consciousness of an
impression of physical objects and then somehow derive or postulate the
physical world we are "experiencing" from that impression.
In contrast, James and Whitehead maintain that we actually
experience the objects themselves as related to us in some way.
Perception is direct or unmediated. When I perceive your body, I do not
perceive an impression of your body that is mysteriously related to your
actual body. I perceive your actual body. Certainly, my conception of
your body is an abstraction from that perception, but James maintains
that I have an experience of your body prior to this conception which is
an experience of your actual body. As for Whitehead, experience is prior
to and more inclusive than our consciousness of it. Furthermore, Hillary
Putnam has characterized James's thought as a form of "direct realism"
or natural realism. Putnam further clarifies that James is claiming that:
the properties and relations we experience are the stuff of the
universe; there is no non-experiential "substratum" . . . and these
experienced or experienceable properties and relations (James is
unfortunately a little vague at this crucial point) make up both minds
and material objects.
Moreover, minds and material objects, in a
243
sense "overlap."
In other words, James argues that we have access to a common world via
our experience. The properties and relations that seem to make up
material objects are also part of our minds. We are related to material
objects and a common world not separated from them by a mysterious
and unbridgeable metaphysical gulf.
James's rejection of the subject/object distinction means that even
though he is defining practical deliberation subjectively, he is not
claiming that it is merely subjective. Since our minds "overlap" with a
common world, subjectivity is not isolated from the world. It is
primarily related to it and has a direct experience of it. In the wholeness
of experience, the mind (subject) and the world (object) are one. Further,
James rejects the idea that there is an objective truth, like economic
analysis, that can resolve practical problems.244
Our truths are
subjectively defined, and he refers to pragmatism as a subjective method
of determining the truth. 45
242.
243.
244.
245.

Hillary Putnam, Pragmatism and Realism, 18 CARDOzO L. REv. 153, 160 (1996).
Id. at 165.
James, Pragmatism'sConception of Truth, supra note 235, at 161-64.
Id.
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Applying James's radical empiricism to judging demands that the
process of judging be looked at from the inside. James recognizes that
"[a]bstract rules can indeed help," but he claims that "they help the less
in proportion as our intuitions are more piercing. 246 Hence, judging
involves the judge taking in all the relevant legal materials, factual
information, and other factors and trying to determine the outcome.
Once the judge has come to a resolution of the case, the judge should
have a sentiment of rationality that her decision makes sense. This
subjective sign is not an "objective justification" of the judge's
conclusion.24 7 However, it is a confirmation that the judge's decision
resonates with what the judge believes is true about the law, the facts,
and how they should relate. Whitehead similarly links judicial decision
making to aesthetic enjoyment and pragmatism by stating that:
Habits of thought and sociological habits survive because in some
broad sense they promote aesthetic enjoyment. There is an ultimate
satisfaction to be derived from them. Thus when the pragmatist asks
whether 'it works,' he is asking whether it issues in aesthetic
satisfaction. The judge of the Supreme Court is giving his decision
on the basis of the aesthetic satisfaction of the harmonization248of the
American Constitution with the activities of modem America.
If a judge does not have a sentiment of rationality or an aesthetic
satisfaction, this should be a sign that the judge's decision is ill-formed.
In other words, the judge must do the best she can to resolve all the loose
ends in the case and come to a decision that she feels confident is right.
The judge knows that this has occurred when she feels a sentiment of
rationality about her decision.
The process does not end once the judge has achieved the sentiment
of rationality-this is not the end of the story. James argues that we
must use the pragmatic method to test these decisions in accordance with
their consequences. The second disciplining factor is thus the pragmatic
testing of judges' decisions. James has confidence that we all experience
246. William James, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, in ESSAYS IN
65, 83 (Alburey Castell ed., 1948).
247. Whitehead similarly recognizes that "intuitive judgment is concerned with
togetherness in experience." WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 100, at 190.
"A judgment is a feeling in the 'process' of the judging subject, and it is correct or
incorrect respecting that subject." Id. at 191. Thus, correctness and incorrectness
concerns the coherence of a proposition with an objective nexus of actual entities. Id. at
190-91.
248. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, ESSAYS IN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 98 (1947)
(emphasis added). In analyzing this passage, Randall Morris helpfully emphasizes the
"striking connection Whitehead makes among aesthetics, pragmatism, and legal
reasoning" here and in other references to practical reasoning. Randall C. Morris,
Whitehead and Legal Realism, 35 PROCESS STUDIES 95, 95 (2006).
PRAGMATISM
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a common world and have access to a common truth, but he is not naive
about the possibility of disagreement about our interpretations of that
world. He recognizes that a plurality of decisions may produce the
sentiment of rationality for different decision makers. Hence, James
argues that we must test these judgments by their fruits; "[t]he results of
the action corroborate or refute the idea from which it flowed., 249 The
verification of a theory or claim means "that if you proceed to act upon
your theory it will be reversed by nothing that later turns up as your
action's fruit; it will harmonize so well with the entire drift of experience
that the latter will, as it were, adopt it, or at most give it an ampler
interpretation, without obliging you in any way to change the essence of
its formulation.,2 50 By contrast, if your decision is mistaken, James
notes that:
the course of experience will throw ever new impediments in the way
of my belief, and become more and more difficult to express in its
language. Epicycle upon epicycle of subsidiary hypotheses will have
to be invoked to give to the discrepant terms a temporary appearance
251
of squaring with each other; but at last even this resource will fail.
In other words, judges must follow the consequences of their decisions.
They must test whether their subjective feeling of rightness has
consequences that verify it.
Accordingly, judges must pay attention to the effects of their
decisions. Did the parties live up to the terms of the court's resolution of
the case? Did similarly situated parties change their behavior because of
the decision? In other words, the court should determine whether the
opinion furnished good or bad incentives for future actors. For example,
if future cases demonstrate that justifying the legal decision requires
numerous "subsidiary hypothesis" that eventually undermine the original
decision, James would argue that the decision has been determined to be
false or misguided and ought to be corrected. Consequently, judicial
intuitions should be subjected to the pragmatic method of testing.
Intuitions must be verified by their consequences for the parties, future
claimants, and future precedent.
In addition, process natural law requires that judges be able to
reconcile their pragmatically tested decisions with the principles of
process natural law. Unlike James, Whitehead would be confident that
judges could provide a rational argument to support their decisions based
on these principles. This would provide an additional check on parochial
judicial bias masquerading as legitimate judicial intuitions.
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VI. Conclusion
Once the top-down principles of process natural law are
complemented by the bottom-up judicial practice of arriving at intuitive
judgments, the unique blend of rational and empirical methods in
Whitehead's Speculative Philosophy is further extended to judicial
decision making and legal reasoning. Searching for the sentiment of
rationality takes the primacy and inclusiveness of experience into
account. Pragmatic testing checks those intuitions, and the principles of
process natural law provide an overarching rational structure for the law
and further discipline judgments in particular cases. Thus, process
natural law provides a balanced and comprehensive method of legal
reasoning that shows great promise for moving past the current
theoretical obstacles in legal theory posed by legal indeterminacy and the
ontological gap between legal theory and the practice of law.
Process philosophy and its theory of natural law also mediate many
of the cultural differences between the East and the West that confront
the leading Western conception of the rule of law. The telos of beauty
(unity-in-diversity) entails maximizing both an Eastern aesthetic sense of
order (emergent harmony or spontaneous order) and a Western rational
sense of order (complexity arising from diverse individual orderings).
Social order arises from diverse and harmonious individual and
collective human choices that partially construct the internal relatedness
of all things in the universe. This constitutes an ongoing process of
"imaging the real" that will never reach a final or fixed state. The "ideal
civilization" will constantly change as society and the larger universe
continue changing.
Finally, process natural law provides for a flexible and culturally
sensitive conception of the rule of law that avoids imperialistically
imposing a Western conception of the rule of law on all nations. This
conception of the rule of law allows for important cultural differences to
be reflected in the interpretation of democracy and formal legality and in
the instantiation of individual rights in the law. The ideal rule of law
may look quite different in countries as different as the U.S. and China.
Thus, the process theory of natural law provides for the creative advance
of the rule of law toward the ideal civilization in a constantly changing,
pluralistic, and multicultural world.

